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ARTICLE
RESOLVING THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY
REGARDING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
IN PRIVATE SECURITIES
FRAUD LITIGATION
Michael J. Kaufman* and John M. Wunderlich**
Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. has injected considera-
ble uncertainty into the securities fraud pleading game, particularly with
respect to the law of confidential informants. Before Tellabs, the circuits
correctly addressed whether confidential sources satisfied the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act's particularity requirement. The essen-
tial inquiry was whether there was a probability that the source had the
information pleaded. However, as we wrote in our prior article, Con-
gress, the Supreme Court, and the Proper Role of Confidential Infor-
mants in Securities Fraud Litigation, some federal circuit courts, after
Tellabs, reassessed this well-settled and well-founded assessment of con-
fidential sources, requiring instead that allegations deriving from confi-
dential sources be steeply discounted based on the PSLRA's scienter
requirement. This approach has been gaining ground as of late.
This emerging trend, however, is based on a fundamental misunder-
standing of how allegations based on information provided by confiden-
tial informants relate to the PSLRA: confidential sources speak to the
particularity of the allegation. These allegations are governed by the
particularity aspect of the PSLRA and not the Tellabs decision or the
"strong inference" requirement. Rather, a proper assessment of allega-
tions by confidential informants involves only an inquiry into whether the
plaintiff has established a probability that the confidential source con-
tains the information claimed-and not an assessment of whether the
allegations give rise to a strong inference of scienter. This Article shows
that assessing confidential source allegations only under the particular-
ity prong of the PSLRA is consistent with the text of PSLRA, Supreme
Court precedent, and the underlying purposes- of the securities laws. Yet
this Article acknowledges that should courts continue to reassess the
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proper role of confidential informants under the scienter prong, this re-
assessment does not require a steep discount or general skepticism of
these allegations out of hand.
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INTRODUCTION
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") requires
that a plaintiff's securities fraud complaint "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the re-
quired state of mind" in defrauding investors,' a significant modification
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 2 Quite often, to meet the
PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements, plaintiffs rely on statements
I Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2) (2006)).
2 "In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's
mind may be alleged generally." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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from confidential sources. 3 Confidential sources4 can serve to "bridge
the gap" between vague allegations of a defendant's access to informa-
tion and an inference of knowledge. 5 Confidential sources have become
a critical component of preventing financial fraud and deterring corpo-
rate misconduct.6
Yet the Supreme Court's most recent securities fraud pleading deci-
sion, Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. ,7 has injected considera-
ble uncertainty into the pleading game.8 Since Tellabs, the federal circuit
courts have developed divergent approaches regarding the pleading re-
quirement, particularly with the law of confidential informants.9 Before
Tellabs, the circuits correctly addressed whether confidential sources
were proper under the PSLRA's particularity requirement.' 0 However,
as we wrote in our prior article, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Proper Role of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, I I
after Tellabs-which was completely silent on the matter-some federal
circuit courts reassessed this well-settled and well-founded assessment of
confidential sources under the scienter requirement and required instead
that allegations deriving from confidential sources be steeply dis-
counted.12 This approach, we demonstrated, incorrectly applied the Tel-
labs decision. We suggested that requiring disclosure of witnesses'
identities at the 12(b)(6) stage relies on the faulty premise that disclosure
will in effect aid the weighing of inferences. Additionally, we main-
tained that requiring a steep discount rested on drawing irrational infer-
ences, as opposed to plausible ones, against the plaintiff at the pleading
3 Just over the past year, the private securities fraud cases that rely on allegations by
confidential informants abound. See, e.g., In re Retek Inc. Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d 690,
696 (D. Minn. 2009); Tsirekidze v. Syntax-Brillian Corp., No. CV-07-2204-PHX-FJM, 2009
WL 275405, at *4-5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 4, 2009); In re Mirant Corp. Sec. Litig. No. 1:02-CV-
1467-RWS, 2009 WL 48199, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2009); Fouad v. Isilon Sys., Inc., No.
C07-1764 MJP, 2008 WL 5412397, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 29, 2008); Hubbard v.
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1273-74 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Silverman v.
Motorola, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-04507, 2008 WL 4360648, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2008).
4 Throughout this article, "confidential source," "corporate source," "confidential in-
formant," and "whistleblower" are used interchangeably.
5 See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1191 (C.D. Cal.
2008).
6 See Ethan D. Wohl, Confidential Informants in Private Litigation: Balancing Interests
in Anonymity and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 551, 554 (2007).
7 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
8 See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading
After Tellabs, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 507, 515-34 (2009) (discussing the new requirements for
successfully demonstrating an inference of scienter).
9 See infra Part IV.
10 See infra Part H.
I I Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Proper Role of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 SEc. REG. L.J. 345
(2008) [hereinafter Kaufman & Wunderlich, Securities Fraud Litigation].
12 Kaufman & Wunderlich, Securities Fraud Litigation, supra note 11, at 354.
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stage. Finally, we demonstrated that Tellabs, if it applied at all to confi-
dential informants, required a different balancing at the 12(b)(6) stage
than that employed by those courts discounting confidential informant
allegations.
This Article further elaborates on the emerging jurisprudence in-
volving confidential informants. Currently, some federal appellate courts
hold that Tellabs left the law regarding confidential informants largely
unchanged. 13 Others however have adopted the "steep discounting" ap-
proach set forth in Higginbotham v. Baxter International.14 One circuit
has taken a different track altogether, requiring courts to be "skeptical"
of allegations from confidential informants. 15 This emerging split, we
submit, is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how allegations
based on information provided by confidential sources relate to the
PSLRA: confidential sources are an issue of particularity, and not scien-
ter. As such, these allegations are governed by the particularity require-
ment that there be a probability that the source have the information
pleaded and not the Tellabs decision and the "strong inference of scien-
ter" requirement.
Part I of this Article first discusses the PSLRA and how it altered
the traditional pleading regime. This Part also discusses the holding
from Tellabs. Part H briefly reviews the state of the law regarding confi-
dential informant allegations before the Tellabs decision. Specifically,
this Part illustrates that while the federal appellate courts differed in de-
gree, they uniformly assessed allegations from confidential informants
under the PSLRA's particularity requirement, and not the scienter aspect.
Part III then illustrates the current jurisprudence surrounding confidential
informants. This Part demonstrates that several circuit courts have reas-
sessed the proper role of confidential informants in securities fraud
pleading by applying the Tel/abs decision and the strong inference
requirement.
Part IV then demonstrates that the proper assessment of allegations
by confidential informants involves only an inquiry into whether the
plaintiff has established a probability that the confidential source con-
tains the information claimed and not an assessment of whether the alle-
gations give rise to a strong inference of scienter. This Part shows that
assessing confidential source allegations only under the particularity
prong of the PSLRA is consistent with the text of PSLRA, Supreme
Court precedent, and the underlying purposes of the securities laws. Part
V concedes that even if the role of confidential informants should be
13 See, e.g., New Jersey Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC, Inc., 537
F.3d 35, 51 (1st Cir. 2008); infra Part IV.A.
14 495 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2007). See infra Part IV.B.
15 See infra Part IV.C.
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reassessed under the strong inference portion of the PSLRA, this reas-
sessment does not require a steep discount of these allegations out of
hand.
I. THE PSLRA, TELLABS, AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
The PSLRA altered how a plaintiff pleads securities fraud. This
Part explores how allegations from confidential sources fit in with the
PSLRA's heightened pleading requirement. This Part also discusses the
Supreme Court's recent Tellabs decision regarding the strong inference
of scienter.
A. The PSLRA Alters the Pleading of Securities Fraud
To establish a securities fraud claim under Section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 193416 and Rule lOb-5 17 a plaintiff must allege
and prove the following: (1) that the defendant made a material misrepre-
sentation or omission (materiality), (2) that the defendant acted with sci-
enter or a wrongful state of mind (scienter), (3) that the material
misrepresentation or omission was made in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security (in connection with), (4) that the plaintiff relied on
the material misrepresentation (reliance), (5) that the plaintiff suffered an
economic loss as a result (economic loss), and (6) that the material mis-
representation actually caused the loss (loss causation).18 Originally, se-
curities fraud cases were assessed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b), which governed all civil allegations of fraud.' 9 Under Rule 9(b) a
plaintiff was required to plead with particularity the circumstances con-
stituting fraud or mistake; in other words the who, what, when, where,
and how. 20 Rule 9(b), however, specifically permitted malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's state of mind to be alleged
generally. 2' Then in 1995, Congress enacted the PSLRA 22 which altered
16 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(mm) (2006).
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
18 Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (citing the elements of a
Rule lOb-5 claim). Scienter is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 188 n.] (1976).
19 See, e.g., Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993).
20 See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (2d Cir. 1990).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
22 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006)).
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the pleading, 23 discovery, 24 and liability25 rules for cases brought under
the federal securities laws. First, the PSLRA enhanced Rule 9(b) by re-
quiring that state of mind be pleaded with particularity. 26 The PSLRA
states:
1. Misleading Statements and Omissions.
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant-
a) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
b) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they
were made, not misleading; the complaint shall specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding
the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the
complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that
belief is formed.27
This aspect of the PSLRA is known as the particularity require-
ment.28 Second, the PSLRA heightened the pleading requirement for
scienter or state of mind:
2. Required State of Mind.
In any private action arising under this chapter in which
the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof
that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind,
the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission
alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.29
23 § 78u-4(b)(l)-(2) (requiring a plaintiff to specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason why each is misleading, and that the misleading statements must give
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with scienter).
24 § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (staying discovery until after a court rules on a 12(b)(6) motion).
25 § 78u-4(f) (changing the standard from joint and several liability to proportionate lia-
bility for certain defendants). Originally, the Act provided for joint and several liability al-
lowing a plaintiff to recover an entire judgment from any one defendant. The PSLRA sought
to remedy this disproportionate bearing of liability, however, and imposed a proportionate
liability standard. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 7 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 686.
26 Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 2000).
27 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
28 Novak, 216 F.3d at 301.
29 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006)). This "strong inference" language was seemingly
adopted from the Second Circuit. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128
2010]
644 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:637
Thus, the PSLRA's pleading requirement has two components: (1) a
specificity and particularity requirement; and (2) a strong inference of
scienter requirement. 30 Both components address the pleading require-
ment, but in different and significant respects. The statutory language
and the legislative history of the PSLRA alone make it unclear whether
Congress intended to abrogate the use of confidential sources in securi-
ties fraud complaints through the PSLRA. 31 Yet in 2002, Congress en-
acted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") without prohibiting the use of
confidential informants in private securities fraud litigation.
B. Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
The Supreme Court in Tellabs addressed the scienter aspect of the
PSLRA's pleading regime and examined what constitutes a "strong in-
ference."' 32 The Supreme Court in Tellabs set out "to prescribe a worka-
ble construction of the 'strong inference' standard. '33 In Tellabs, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant falsely reassured investors that the
defendant was continuing to enjoy strong demand for its products when,
(2d Cir. 1994) ("The requisite 'strong inference' of fraud may be established either (a) by
alleging facts to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b)
by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or
recklessness."). But the legislative history suggests that Congress explicitly rejected the Sec-
ond Circuit's requirement that a plaintiff must allege motive and opportunity or reckless or
conscious behavior. Congress aimed for a standard similar to Rule 9(b), but above the Second
Circuit's interpretation. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740. Congress specifically refrained from including motive, opportunity,
or recklessness in the language of the statute. Id. at 49 n.23.
30 The Third Circuit explained:
The PSLRA provides two distinct pleading requirements.... First, under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(b)(1), the complaint "must specify each allegedly misleading statement,
why the statement was misleading, and, if an allegation is made on information and
belief, all facts supporting that belief with particularity".... Second, the complaint
must, "with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind."
Inst. Invs. Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(b)(1)-(2)). See also Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 913, 925 (2003) (noting that the pleading requirement actu-
ally has three components: (1) a specificity requirement, (2) a particularity requirement for
complaints pleaded on information and belief, and (3) the strong inference requirement).
31 Kathryn B. McKenna, Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Using Confidential Sources
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: It's All in the Details, 55 RUTGERS
L.J. 205, 208 (2002) (discussing how Congressmen Ed Bryant and John Dingell argued that a
plaintiff would be required to submit a witness list with his complaint, but noting that Con-
gress did not address concerns relating to confidential sources).
32 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs), 551 U.S. 308, 321-24 (2007).
33 Id. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court in an 8-1 decision; Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer joined;
Justices Scalia and Alito concurred in the judgment; and Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at 311.
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in fact, the defendant knew the opposite to be true. 34 The plaintiffs based
their allegations on information provided by twenty-seven different con-
fidential sources. 35
The Supreme Court, without addressing the merits of the case, set
forth a three-step analysis for pleading scienter. First, in ruling on a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a Rule lOb-5 action, a court must accept all
factual allegations in the complaint as true.36 Second, a court must ask
whether all the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong in-
ference of scienter, rather than whether any individual allegation, scruti-
nized in isolation, meets that standard.37 Third, a court must weigh
opposing inferences and find that a reasonable person would deem the
inference of scienter at least as likely as any opposing inference. 38 The
Supreme Court did not address the fact that the plaintiff rested its allega-
tions on information from confidential informants. The majority men-
tioned that the allegations stemmed from confidential sources only in its
statement of facts. 39
To illustrate its new scienter standard, the Court responded to a sce-
nario posed by Justice Scalia in his concurrence. 40 Justice Scalia posed
the following problem: "If a jade falcon were stolen from a room to
which only A and B had access, could it possibly be said there was a
"strong inference" that B was the thief?" 41 The majority opinion, relying
on tort principles, stated that, "law enforcement officials as well as the
owner of the precious falcon would find the inference of guilt as to B
34 Id. at 315.
35 Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs 1), 437 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2006),
vacated by Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
36 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322.
37 Id. at 322-23. This step adopts the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Gompper v.
VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2002), which required courts to consider and weigh
inferences.
38 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323-24. (noting the failure of the Seventh Circuit to compare
opposing inferences). Weighing inferences at the 12(b)(6) stage poses considerable Seventh
Amendment concerns and violates a securities fraud plaintiffs right to a jury trial. See, e.g.,
Allan Horwich & Sean Siekkinen, Pleading Reform or Unconstitutional Encroachment? An
Analysis of the Seventh Amendment Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 35 SEc. REG. L.J. 4, 7-8 (2007), available at http://schiffhardin.com/binary/horwich
spring07.pdf; Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MiNN.
L. REV. 1851 (2008); John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The
Weighing Game, 39 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 672-79 (2007).
39 The Tellabs majority stated:
The Shareholders then amended their complaint, adding references to 27 confidential
sources and making further, more specific, allegations concerning Notebaert's
mental state. The District Court again dismissed, this time with prejudice. The
Shareholders had sufficiently pleaded that Notebaert's statements were misleading,
the court determined, but they had insufficiently alleged that he acted with scienter.
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 316-17 (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 324 n.5.
41 Id. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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quite strong-certainly strong enough to warrant further investigation.
Indeed, an inference, at least as likely as competing inferences can, in
some cases, warrant recovery. 42
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT TREATMENT BEFORE TELLABS AND
EVALUATIONS BASED ON PARTICULARITY
As this Part demonstrates, before Tellabs, the circuits addressed the
propriety of confidential sources in securities fraud litigation by assess-
ing whether these allegations satisfied the PSLRA's particularity re-
quirement. In general, the courts agreed that allegations by a
confidential source would be permitted so long as the sources were iden-
tified with a sufficient degree of particularity such that it was indicative
of a probability of knowledge. But the federal circuits disagreed over the
requisite degree of particularity required.
A. The Second and Fifth Circuits: The Reference Test for
Particularity
Before Tellabs, the Second and Fifth Circuits assessed only whether
allegations by confidential sources satisfied the PSLRA's particularity
requirement. 43 For example, the Second Circuit's leading case address-
ing the propriety of confidential informants, Novak v. Kasaks,44 did so in
the portion of its opinion labeled "Particularity of the Facts Pleaded,"
clearly indicating an assessment based on the particularity prong rather
than the substantive strong inference prong.4 The Second Circuit al-
lowed the use of confidential informants so long as they were described
with sufficient particularity. 46 In Novak, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant, a mega-retailer, made materially false and misleading state-
ments and omissions concerning its financial performance. 47 The plain-
tiffs, relying on confidential sources, claimed that the defendant engaged
in "box and hold" inventory practices. 48 The district court dismissed the
complaint because the plaintiffs failed to reveal their confidential
sources.
49
42 Id. at 324 n.5 (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3-5 (Cal. 1948). Traditional tort
principles have played a substantial role in private securities fraud jurisprudence. See Dura
Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343-44 (2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 525 (1976) in interpreting the securities fraud requirement of loss causation).
43 Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 259 (5th Cir. 2005); Novak v. Kasaks,
216 F.3d 300, 312-14 (2d Cir. 2000).
44 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000).
45 Id. at 312.
46 Id. at 314.
47 Id. at 304.
48 Id. A "box and hold" inventory practice is a practice whereby the defendant would
warehouse a large quantity of obsolete inventory without marking it down. Id.
49 Id. at 304-05.
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The Second Circuit overruled the district court though, calling its
conclusion that plaintiffs cannot rest their allegations on anonymous for-
mer employees, "flawed in several respects."' 50 First, the Second Circuit
reasoned that the actual language of the PSLRA as enacted does not re-
quire the revelation of sources. 51 Instead, the Act "requires plaintiffs to
plead only facts and makes no mention of the sources of these facts."15
2
The Second Circuit then stated that even if sources must be identified,
there is no requirement that they be named so long as they were de-
scribed with sufficient particularity. 53 From a policy perspective, the
Second Circuit opined that imposing a requirement of disclosure would
"deter informants from providing critical information to investigators in
meritorious cases or invite retaliation against them."'54 The Second Cir-
cuit, however, required plaintiffs to allege facts from either people or
documentary evidence and that the complaint refer to at least one of
these sources with specificity. 55
The Fifth Circuit, in ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk,56
likewise assessed the propriety of confidential informants under the
PSLRA's particularity requirement as opposed to the strong inference
prong.57 The Fifth Circuit stated that the PSLRA does not require plain-
tiffs to name confidential sources so long as other documentary evidence
provides an adequate basis for believing the defendant's statements or
omissions were false or misleading. 58 In a later decision, Barrie v. In-
tervoice-Brite, Inc.,59 the Fifth Circuit laid out its three-step approach to
assessing allegations stemming from confidential informants:
(1) [I]f plaintiffs rely on confidential personal sources
and other facts, their sources need not be named in the
complaint so long as the other facts, i.e., documentary
evidence, provide an adequate basis for believing that
50 Id. at 312.
51 Id. at 313 ("In fact, the applicable provisions of the law as ultimately enacted requires
plaintiffs to plead only facts and makes no mention of the sources of these facts.").
52 Id.
53 Id. at 314.
54 Id.
55 Id. This standard was also adopted by the First Circuit in In re Cabletron Sys., Inc.,
311 F.3d 11, 29 (lst Cir. 2002), the Third Circuit in California Public Employee's Retirement
Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 2004), the Fourth Circuit in Teachers'
Retirement Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 167, 173-74 (4th Cir. 2007) and the Fifth Circuit in
ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 351-52 (5th Cir. 2002).
56 291 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2002).
57 Id. at 351-52.
58 Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 259 (5th Cir. 2005). See also ABC Arbi-
trage, 291 F.3d at 353.
59 397 F.3d at 259.
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the defendants' statements or omissions were false or
misleading. 60
In other words, if the allegation is supported by a confidential
source and documentary evidence, it satisfies the PSLRA's particularity
requirement.
(2) [L]f the other facts, i.e., documentary evidence, do
not provide an adequate basis for believing that the de-
fendants' statements or omissions were false, the com-
plaint need not name the personal sources so long as
they are identified through general descriptions in the
complaint with sufficient particularity to support the
probability that a person in the position occupied by the
source as described would possess the information
pleaded to support the allegations of false or misleading
statements made on information and belief. 61
According to the Fifth Circuit, if the allegation is supported by only
a confidential source, the plaintiff must provide a general description of
the source such that it shows that there is a probability that the source
possessed the information pleaded.
(3) [I]f the other facts, i.e., documentary evidence, do
not provide an adequate basis for believing that the de-
fendants' statements or omissions were false and the de-
scriptions of the personal sources are not sufficiently
particular to support the probability that a person in the
position occupied by the source would possess the infor-
mation pleaded to support the allegations of false or mis-
leading statements made on information and belief, the
complaint must name the personal sources. 62
Last, if the plaintiff fails to satisfy the particularity requirement
through either documentary evidence or a confidential source, the
PSLRA requires that the source be named.63 Thus, the Fifth Circuit did
not require that confidential sources be named, only that the sources are
identified with general descriptions that provide a probability for the ve-
racity of their allegations. 64 Both the Second and the Fifth Circuits rec-
ognized that the PSLRA's particularity requirement permits confidential
60 Id.
61 Id. (italics added).
62 ABC Arbitrage, 291 F.3d at 353.
63 See Barrie, 397 F.3d at 259; ABC Arbitrage, 291 F.3d at 353.
64 Barrie, 397 F.3d at 259.
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source allegations; 65 the Circuits did not assess the use of confidential
sources under the PSLRA's scienter standard. 66 Moreover, the Second
and Fifth Circuits recognized that the essential inquiry for confidential
informants was whether there was a probability that the source had the
information pleaded.67
B. The Ninth Circuit: Confidential Informants Must be Named
Before Tellabs, the Ninth Circuit likewise addressed the propriety of
confidential sources in a securities fraud pleading under the particularity
requirement of the PSLRA.68 In In re Silicon Graphics,69 the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that confidential sources would fail the PSLRA's particularity
requirement where the plaintiff fails to include adequate corroborating
details. 70 In In re Silicon Graphics, the plaintiffs brought a securities
fraud class action suit against the defendant corporation, a manufacturer
of software. 71 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant made misleading
statements that artificially inflated the company's stock price.72 The
plaintiffs based their allegations on anonymous internal reports allegedly
read and received by the corporation's officers.73 The district court dis-
missed the complaint because the plaintiffs failed to "provide a list of all
relevant circumstances in great detail. ' 74 The district court ruled that the
PSLRA required plaintiffs to reveal the names of confidential sources. 75
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal because the
plaintiffs did not list the contents of the reports, who prepared them,
which officers reviewed them, and from whom the source of the report
obtained the information. 76 In other words, the "adequate corroborating
65 See Barrie, 397 F.3d at 259; ABC Arbitrage, 291 F.3d at 351-52; Novak v. Kasaks,
216 F.3d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 2000).
66 See Barrie, 397 F.3d at 259; ABC Arbitrage, 291 F.3d at 353; Novak, 216 F.3d at 312.
67 Barrie, 397 F.3d at 259 (quoting ABC Arbitrage, 291 F.3d at 353); Novak, 216 F.3d at
314.
68 In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig. (Silicon 1), 183 F.3d 970, 984-85 (9th Cir. 1999).
The dissent likewise addressed the propriety of confidential sources under the particularity
prong. Id. at 998-99 (Browning, J., dissenting).
69 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
70 Id. at 985.
71 Id. at 979-80.
72 Id. at 980.
73 Id. at 984.
74 Id. at 985.
75 In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig. (Silicon 1), 970 F. Supp. 746, 764 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
76 Silicon II, 183 F.3d at 984. The dissent strongly disagreed with the majority and noted
that the plaintiffs had pleaded the requisite "who, what, when, where, and how" kind of facts:
[The plaintiffs] alleged that daily and monthly reports: (1) were prepared by "SGI's
financial department" (who); (2) informed "SGI's top managers, such as [the indi-
vidual defendants]" of production problems with the Indigo2, as well as sluggish
sales in North America and Europe which resulted in SGI's inability to meet its
financial goals (what); (3) were distributed at specific times during the class period
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details" suggested by the Ninth Circuit included disclosure of some
form. 77 The Ninth Circuit was primarily concerned with Congress's per-
ceived intent in creating procedural hurdles in private securities litigation
through the PSLRA.78 The Ninth Circuit's In re Silicon Graphics deci-
sion has been interpreted to impose a blanket requirement that confiden-
tial sources must be named. 79
C. The Tenth Circuit: Particularity Case-by-Case
The Tenth Circuit, while taking a different approach to the required
specificity, likewise assessed whether confidential sources were appro-
priate under the particularity requirement for plaintiffs' allegations
before Tellabs.80 The Tenth Circuit rejected a per se rule concerning
confidential informants altogether. 81 The Tenth Circuit, much like the
Second,82 acknowledged that the particularity requirement of the PSLRA
only requires plaintiffs to allege facts, and not the source of those facts. 83
The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected the Second Circuit's requirement-
that if personal sources were not specified, then the complaint must refer
to documentary evidence in the alternative 84-stating it was "too restric-
tive." 85 The Tenth Circuit rejected a per se rule discounting confidential
informants because it would force plaintiffs to plead their evidence in
their complaint:
The PSLRA did not, however, purport to move up the
trial to the pleadings stage. While the PSLRA certainly
heightened pleading standards for securities fraud law-
suits, we believe that if Congress had intended in securi-
ties fraud lawsuits to abolish the concept of notice
pleading that underlies the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Congress would have done so explicitly. Clearly,
the Reform Act requires some precision in alleging facts,
(when); (4) were presented in the form of daily reports . . . (where); and (5) were
suppressed by the named defendants in an alleged cover-up... (how).
Id. at 998 (Browning, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 985.
78 Id. at 988. The dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint was not due solely to the plain-
tiff's failure to name confidential sources, but also because of the plaintiff's broader failure to
create a sufficient strong inference of scienter. Id. at 980.
79 See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007); In re
Party City Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 282, 305-06 (D.N.J. 2001); In re Nice Sys. Ltd. Sec.
Litig., 135 F. Supp. 2d 551, 571 (D.N.J. 2001); but see In re Daou Sys. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d
1006 (9th Cir. 2005).
80 Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 2003).
81 Id. at 1101.
82 See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000).
83 Adams, 340 F.3d at 1101.
84 Novak, 216 F.3d at 314.
85 Adams, 340 F.3d at 1101.
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however, it does not require pleading all of the evidence
and proof thereunder supporting a plaintiffs claim.
8 6
The Tenth Circuit stated that all that is required in the pleading is
sufficient particularity to put the defendant on notice of the plaintiffs
claim. 87 But the Tenth Circuit cautioned that this was a "common-sense,
case-by-case approach. '8 8 Again, the focus was on the particularity re-
quirement and whether there was a likelihood that the confidential source
had the information alleged. 89
III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT TREATMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANTS AFrER TELLABS AND REEVALUATIONS BASED
ON SCIENTER
In 2007, the Supreme Court's Tellabs decision changed much about
the pleading game and securities litigation in general. For example, Tel-
labs has altered the pleading balance in some circuits 90 and called into
question whether plaintiffs could establish scienter by alleging either
motive and opportunity or facts which constitute circumstantial evidence
of recklessness or conscious behavior in others. 91 Additionally though, it
has significantly affected the role of confidential informants in securities
86 Id.; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) ("Just as Rule
9(b) makes no mention of municipal liability... neither does it refer to employment discrimi-
nation. Thus complaints in these cases, as in most others, must satisfy only the simple require-
ments of Rule 8(a)."); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (Rule 9(b)'s particularized pleading requirements do not ex-
tend to § 1983 claims regarding municipal actions); Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, Inc.
(Tellabs 1), 437 F.3d 588, 600 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd. (TeUabs), 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (enactment of the PSLRA did not change the
standard for pleading scienter); BLACK'S LAW DicTnONARY 620 (8th ed. 1999) ("expressio
unius est exclusion alterius. A canon of construction holding that to express or include one
thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.").
87 Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1102 (10th Cir. 2003). The Tenth
Circuit admitted, however, that disclosing sources would strengthen a plaintiff's claim. Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1100-03.
90 See, e.g., Frank v. Dana, 547 F.3d 564, 567 (6th Cir. 2008); New Jersey Carpenters
Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC, Inc., 537 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that
Tellabs requires courts to rule for the plaintiffs in the case of a tie).
91 See, e.g., Inst. Invs. Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 267-69 (3d Cir. 2009) (stat-
ing that Tellabs does not permit a plaintiff to establish scienter through either motive and
opportunity or facts which serve as circumstantial evidence of recklessness or conscious be-
havior, but rather requires a holistic assessment); Zucco Partners LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552
F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating Tellabs requires a two-step analysis requiring assessment of
individual allegations first, and then assessment of the complaint holistically). But cf Dorsey
v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Alleged facts are sufficient to
support .. .an inference [of fraud] if they either (1) show a defendant's motive to commit
securities fraud or (2) identify circumstances that indicate conscious behavior on the part of the
defendant.") (quoting Hermann Holdings, Ltd. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 302 F.3d 552 (5th
Cir. 2002)).
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fraud litigation. As this Part demonstrates, because of Tellabs, almost all
federal circuits have reexamined the propriety of confidential informants
under the "strong inference of scienter" prong of the PSLRA's height-
ened pleading standard, and some circuits have begun to "steeply dis-
count" these allegations. This Part first examines those decisions that
have reassessed confidential informant allegations under the strong infer-
ence prong, but recognized that Tellabs had no effect on the law concern-
ing confidential informants. Conversely, one line of cases has adopted
the Higginbotham approach, steeply discounting confidential informants
under the strong inference prong. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has
announced a different, more moderate standard, calling for skepticism of
confidential sources. There can be no doubt however, that because of
Tellabs, the federal circuits have reevaluated the law on confidential
sources under the scienter standard.
A. The First and Second Circuits: Reevaluating but Staying the
Course
The First Circuit and several lower courts in the Second Circuit
have suggested that Tellabs did not alter the law on confidential infor-
mants. 92 For instance, in New Jersey Carpenters Pension & Annuity
Funds v. Biogen IDEC, Inc. ,93 the First Circuit held that Tellabs did not
alter its law on confidential informants. 94 In Biogen, the plaintiffs
brought a federal securities class action against a drug company, alleging
that its executives intentionally misrepresented the safety and the market
for a particular drug developed by the company.95 As part of their com-
plaint, based on information provided by confidential sources, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the company hid data regarding the safety of the drug
from the Food and Drug Administration. 96 The lower court dismissed
the action for failing to allege a strong inference of scienter as required
by the PSLRA. 97
92 See, e.g., Biogen, 537 F.3d at 51; In re Nova Gold Inc. Sec. Litig., 620 F. Supp. 2d
272, 298 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re PXRE Group, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d 510,
526-27 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); City of Brockton Ret. Sys. v. Shaw Group, Inc., 540 F. Supp.
2d 464, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting the Seventh Circuit's discounting standard). The
Ninth Circuit has not specifically spoken on the subject, but a recent decision from the Ninth
Circuit only analyzed the particularity of confidential informants, without indicating that Tel-
labs changed the Ninth Circuit's previous assessment of confidential informants. Shurkin v.
Golden State Vintners, 303 F. App'x 431, 433 (9th Cir. 2008).
93 537 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2008).
94 Id. at 51.
95 Id. at 37.
96 Id. at 49-50.
97 New Jersey Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC, Inc., 537 F.3d 35,
43-44 (1st Cir. 2008).
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On appeal however, the First Circuit rejected the defendant's invita-
tion to revise the law on confidential sources in light of Tellabs.98 The
First Circuit stated:
Tellabs requires that all information in plaintiffs' com-
plaint be evaluated. We think that includes confidential
source information, subject to the restrictions stated in
our case law. We have never said a complaint would
survive if it were based only on confidential source alle-
gations. Indeed, we have said there must be a hard look
at such allegations to evaluate their worth. 99
Nevertheless, the First Circuit further observed there was an impor-
tant policy in allowing confidential source allegations:
Scienter involves wrongdoing by high-level company of-
ficials; low-level employees or consultants may well
know of the wrongdoing and wish to disclose it but fear
retaliation if their names appear among the accusers.
Legislatures, both federal and state, have recognized
similar fears in enacting anti-retaliation statutes and in
encouraging whistleblowers. Some allowance at the mo-
tion to dismiss stage for consideration of confidential
sources in litigation is consistent with those policies.1
In this case, the substance of the confidential sources' allegations
failed to give rise to a strong inference of scienter because, the court
reasoned, the confidential sources' allegations were not corroborated
with any other evidence.' 10 The court was concerned with the fact that
the allegations based on a confidential source failed to state when the
defendant knew its statement was materially misleading.10 2 Addition-
ally, the court rejected other allegations based on information from confi-
dential sources because the allegations were too vague to give rise to a
strong inference of scienter.10 3 Thus, the First Circuit reevaluated the
use of confidential sources under the scienter standard, but held that Tel-
labs left the law regarding confidential informants largely unchanged:
confidential sources still require a probability that they had the informa-
tion pleaded. 104
98 Id. at 51.
99 Id. (internal citations omitted).
100 Id. at 52.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 52-53 (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 53 (rejecting a confidential source allegation because an allegation of a "serious"
adverse event report provides no information regarding whether these reports were confirmed
or connected with the conduct at issue).
104 Id. at 52.
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B. The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits: Discounting Allegations
from Confidential Informants
1. The Origins of the Discounting, Scienter-Based Approach:
Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l
The leading case post-Tellabs on confidential sources that requires a
"steep discount" of their allegations and assessed the adequacy of an al-
legation from confidential sources from a strong inference standpoint is
Higginbotham v. Baxter International.10 5 In Higginbotham, the Seventh
Circuit held that all allegations attributed to confidential witnesses must
be steeply discounted at the motion to dismiss stage because there is no
way to consider opposing inferences. 106 It was the first appellate court to
illustrate the Tellabs rule at length as applied to confidential informants
and it struck down the plaintiffs' complaint as it relied primarily on con-
fidential informants. 10 7 The Higginbotham court assessed the sufficiency
of allegations based on confidential informants from a "strong inference"
standpoint, rather than a particularity standpoint.10 8
In Higginbotham the defendant company, Baxter International, an-
nounced it would restate the preceding three years' earnings to correct
fraudulent statements by its Brazilian subsidiary.109 The court applied
the Tellabs rule requiring courts to weigh both culpable and nonculpable
inferences at the motion to dismiss stage. 110 The Higginbotham court
stated that all allegations attributed to confidential witnesses must be dis-
counted, as there was no way to engage in an evaluative comparison;
there was no way to consider opposing inferences in this situation."'
The Higginbotham court noted that before the Supreme Court decided
Tellabs, the Seventh Circuit abided by the standard it laid out in Makor
Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, which rejected a bright line rule and allowed
confidential sources so long as the descriptions supported the probability
that the sources had the information alleged. 112 The Higginbotham court
argued, however, that "[o]ne upshot of the approach that Tellabs an-
nounced is that we must discount allegations that the complaint attributes
105 495 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2007).
106 See id. at 756-57.
107 See id. at 761.
108 See id. at 756-57.
109 See id. at 755-56. The Brazilian subsidiary reported sales made earlier than their
actual dates to accelerate revenue. Id. When revenue could no longer be accelerated, they
simply made up sales data. Id.
110 See id. at 757. Also, at oral argument the court stated they could be "any kind of
snitch, any kind of liar." Posting of J. Robert Brown, Jr. to The Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2007/09/28/the-tellabs-excuse-and-confidential-witnesses/ (Sept. 28, 2007, 4:24 PM).
S11 See Higginbotham, 495 F.3d at 757.
112 See id. at 756.
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to five confidential witnesses."'1 13 Specifically, the court stated that,
"[p]erhaps these confidential sources have axes to grind. Perhaps they
are lying. Perhaps they don't even exist.... Tellabs requires judges to
weigh the strength of plaintiffs' favored inference in comparison to other
possible inferences; anonymity frustrates that process."'1 14 The court
seemed particularly concerned that confidential sources would never be
revealed: "At oral argument, we asked when the identity of these five
persons would be revealed. . . . The answer we received was that the
sources' identity would never be revealed, which means their stories
can't be checked. . . . There is no "informer's privilege" in civil
litigation."' 15
Nonetheless, the Higginbotham court provided for a limited role for
confidential sources when it stated that "[i]t is possible to imagine situa-
tions in which statements by anonymous sources may corroborate or dis-
ambiguate evidence from disclosed sources."' " 6 Thus, the court left
open the possibility that perhaps confidential sources could be used to
bolster claims. 1 7 But the court provided no further guidance as to when
this limited situation would arise. In the end however, the allegations
stemming from confidential informants were all "discounted" and the
complaint dismissed." 18
2. Higginbotham's Increasing Acceptance Among the Circuit
Courts
The Higginbotham decision called into question the validity of con-
fidential sources in securities litigation and it has been gaining ground
among the circuit courts. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits, for instance, have
adopted this "steep discount," scienter-based approach to confidential
sources. 19 Previously, the Fifth Circuit refrained from reassessing alle-
gations from confidential sources from a "strong inference" standpoint
and held that these allegations were a permissible basis on which to infer
scienter.120 However, a recent Fifth Circuit decision, Indiana Electric
Workers' Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Group,12' has cited the Sev-
enth Circuit's Higginbotham decision with approval and stated that
113 Id. at 757 (internal quotes omitted).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See id.
118 Id. at 757, 761.
119 See Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 811 (6th Cir. 2008); Cent. Laborers' Pension
Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 553 (5th Cir. 2007).
120 See Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund, 497 F.3d at 552; see also Kaufman & Wunderlich,
Securities Fraud Litigation, supra note 11, at 352-53 (analyzing the Cent. Laborers'
decision).
121 537 F.3d 527, 535 (5th Cir. 2008).
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"courts must discount allegations from confidential sources." 122 The
Fifth Circuit even echoed the reasoning of the Higginbotham court and
stated that "[sluch sources afford no basis for drawing the plausible com-
peting inferences required by Tellabs."'123 Similarly, a district court in
the Fifth Circuit held in In re Dell Securities Litigation124 that resting
allegations on information provided from confidential sources "detracts
from their weight in the scienter analysis." 125
The Sixth Circuit has likewise reformed its jurisprudence regarding
confidential informants, requiring that they satisfy both the particularity
and the "strong inference" prongs. For example, in Ley v. Visteon
Corp.,126 the Sixth Circuit cited the Higginbotham standard with ap-
proval in denying allegations by confidential informants. 27 In Ley, the
plaintiffs sued the defendant corporation, a Ford spin-off and global sup-
plier of automotive systems and components. 28 As part of the spin-off,
the defendant-corporation and Ford filed a prospectus and registration
statement with the SEC. 129 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's
prospectus was misleading and inaccurate in violation of Section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933130 and that when the defendant reported its
fourth quarter and full year financial results and other filings with the
SEC, it violated Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-
122 See id. at 535; Grillo v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 3d 809, 820 (E.D. Ky.
2008).
123 Indiana Elec. Workers' Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Group, Inc., 537 F.3d 527,
535 (5th Cir. 2008).
124 591 F. Supp. 2d 877 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
125 In re Dell Sec. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 877, 895 (W.D. Tex. 2008). The In re Dell
court stated that for allegations from confidential sources to be given any weight they must (1)
be described with sufficient particularity to support the probability that a person in the position
occupied by the source would possess the information pleaded; and (2) allege with particular-
ity when a comment was made to a confidential source. See also Indiana Elec. Workers'
Pension Trust Fund IBEW, 537 F.3d at 538 (confidential statements capable of many interpre-
tations cannot contribute to a strong inference of scienter); Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund, 497
F.3d at 552 (violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles do not on their own
establish scienter); Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 382 (5th
Cir. 2004) (strong inference of scienter not found when allegations were not pleaded with
sufficient particularity to attach to a particular individual); ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v.
Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 353 (5th Cir. 2002) (adopting the Second Circuit's particularized
pleading requirements).
126 543 F.3d 801 (6th Cir. 2008)
127 Id. at 811; see also In re Proquest Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 728, 739-40 (E.D.
Mich. 2007) (information from confidential sources cannot be the sole basis of information,
but nevertheless cannot be wholly discounted). But see In re Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F.
Supp. 2d 968, 993 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (information from confidential sources must be dis-
counted, but not ignored).
128 See Ley, 543 F.3d at 804.
129 See id. at 804.
130 See id. at 805. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 sets forth civil liabilities to
purchasers with respect to any material misstatement or omission in connection with a registra-
tion statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
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5.131 As part of their allegations, the plaintiffs, relying on an anonymous
source, alleged that the defendant acted with a strong inference of scien-
ter because the defendant intentionally violated Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles ("GAAP"). 132 The plaintiffs claimed that according
to a senior finance director at the defendant-corporation, the defendant
booked customer rebates obtained from suppliers in the year the contract
was entered into, as opposed to the year the rebates had actually been
received.' 33 This same senior finance director also claimed that the de-
fendant's suppliers would pass along increases in the price of materials
for the goods sold to the defendant, but rather than book these
surcharges, the defendant would defer them. 134 The district court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed. 135 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that anonymous sources "are
not altogether irrelevant to the scienter analysis," but dismissed the alle-
gations because the plaintiffs failed to allege not only who knew, but
further what, where, when, and how they knew (the particularity aspect
of the PSLRA). 136 The Sixth Circuit ultimately dismissed the allegations
based on the confidential source, citing the Seventh Circuit's Higginbot-
ham decision steeply discounting allegations from confidential
sources. 1
3 7
3. Tempering the Higginbotham Approach
But the federal courts are far from resolute in their adherence to the
Higginbotham "steep discount," scienter approach. Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit, the originator of the "steep discount," scienter approach, appears
to have tempered the Higginbotham decision. 138 When Tellabs went
back to the Seventh Circuit on remand in Tellabs II, the court impliedly
accepted Higginbotham's reevaluation of confidential sources based on
scienter, but tempered Higginbotham's ruling on confidential sources, al-
lowing the sources to persist so long as there was a sufficient probability
131 See Ley, 543 F.3d at 805; 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
132 See Ley, 543 F.3d at 811. GAAP violations are commonly alleged to establish that the
defendants acted with scienter in making fraudulent misstatements or omissions. Schleicher v.
Wendt, 529 F. Supp. 2d 959, 971-72 (S.D. Ind. 2007). But courts generally refuse to infer that
an executive must have known about accounting improprieties. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Gould,
554 F.3d 962, 965-66 (11 th Cir. 2009); In re Dell Sec. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 877, 895 (W.D.
Tex. 2008); Roth v. Officemax, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 791, 798 (N.D. 111. 2007); Selbst v.
McDonald's Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 777, 784 (N.D. Il1. 2006); Davis v. SPSS, Inc., 385 F.
Supp. 2d 697, 709-10 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
133 See Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 811 (6th Cir. 2008).
134 See id.
135 See id. at 804.
136 See id. at 811.
137 See id.
138 See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs (Tellabs 11), 513 F.3d 702, 711-12 (7th
Cir. 2008).
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that they had the information pleaded. 139 In Tellabs II, the Seventh Cir-
cuit dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that without the assurance of con-
fidentiality for employee informants, plaintiffs would not "be able to get
to first base .... -"140 With whistleblower laws preventing employer re-
taliation, the Seventh Circuit saw no reason for employees to be fear-
ful. 41 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted that informants have no
evidentiary privilege and ultimately their identity would be revealed in
pretrial discovery. 142 In addition, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that
allegations based on anonymous informants are difficult to assess and it
would have been better had the sources been named.143
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit found that the allegations deriving
from these confidential sources were sufficient. 144 In so doing, the Sev-
enth Circuit departed from Higginbotham's steep discount approach and
listed a number of factors reminiscent of Novak v. Kasaks and ABC Arbi-
trage v. Tchuruk, that justified reliance on these confidential sources. 145
Among the factors were the numerousness of the sources, whether they
were in a position to know the information first-hand, whether they were
prepared to testify, whether the allegations were described with enough
specificity as to make them convincing, and whether the information was
corroborated with multiple sources. 146 Because these factors all weighed
in favor of the plaintiffs, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the absence
of proper names did not invalidate the drawing of a strong inference from
the informants' assertions.147
139 Tellabs H, 513 F.3d at 711. In Higginbotham, the Seventh Circuit panel consisted of
Chief Judge Easterbrook writing for the court, Judge Posner, and Judge Ripple. Higginbotham
v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 755 (7th Cir. 2007). In Tellabs H, the panel consisted of
Judge Posner writing for the court, Judge Wood, and Judge Sykes. Tellabs 11, 513 F.3d at 704.
This moderated approach has been recognized by Silverman v. Motorola, Inc., No. 07-C-4507,
2008 WL 4360648, at *14 (N.D. I11. Sept. 23, 2008).
140 Tellabs 11, 513 F.3d at 711.
141 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006)). The statute also provides for a remedy for
injured persons. § 1514A(c) (providing for any relief necessary to make the employee whole
and a variety of compensatory damages).
142 Tellabs I, 513 F.3d at 711.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 712.
145 Tellabs 11, 513 F.3d at 711-12 (citing Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 312-14 (2d Cir.
2000) and ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 353-54 (5th Cir. 2002)).
146 Tellabs H, 513 F.3d at 712 ('The confidential sources listed in the complaint.., are
numerous and consist of persons who from the description of their jobs were in a position to
know at first hand the facts to which they are prepared to testify... The information that the
confidential informants are reported to have obtained is set forth in convincing detail, with
some of the information, moreover, corroborated by multiple sources.").
147 Id.
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C. The Eleventh Circuit: A General Skepticism
Post-Tellabs, the Eleventh Circuit in Mizzaro v. Home Depot,
Inc. 148 entered the fray on confidential sources and stated that courts
must be skeptical of confidential sources. 149 Suggestive of the Tenth
Circuit's pre-Tellabs approach, the Eleventh Circuit does not require a
per se rejection of confidential sources. 150 In Mizzaro, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit addressed the status of confidential informants post-Tellabs at
length. 151 As part of its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit compared its as-
sessment of confidential sources to a court's assessment of affidavits
used to establish probable cause for search warrants:
Courts are often called upon to evaluate confidential
sources to determine whether an affidavit establishes
probable cause to issue a search warrant. In that area of
law, it is well-settled that a confidential, indeed even an
anonymous source may support a finding of probable
cause where the tipster provides the specific basis for his
knowledge.... Applying the same logic here, we see no
reason to adopt a per se rule that always requires a secur-
ities-fraud complaint to name the confidential source, so
long as the complaint unambiguously provides in a cog-
nizable and detailed way the basis of the whistleblower' s
knowledge. 152
But this approach was advocated by Justice Stevens in his dissent in
Tellabs.153 Justice Stevens argued that the scienter standard should be
similar to the probable cause standard in criminal proceedings. 154 And
he reasoned that just as citizens suspected of criminal activity can be
subject to search only after a finding of probable cause, so too should
148 Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008).
149 Id. at 1239.
150 Compare Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1283 (S.D.
Fla. 2008), with Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1102 (10th Cir. 2003).
151 Mizzaro, 544 F.3d at 1239; see also Edward J. Goodman Life Income Trust v. Jabil
Circuit, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (quoting Mizzaro).
152 Mizzaro, 544 F.3d at 1239-40 (emphasis omitted).
153 Justice Stevens remarked:
[Congress] implicitly delegated significant lawmaking authority to the Judiciary in
determining how that standard should operate in practice .... In addition to the
benefit of its grounding in an already familiar legal concept, using a probable-cause
standard would avoid ... [forcing a court to] 'take into account plausible opposing
inferences.'
Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs), 551 U.S. 308, 336 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
154 "There are times when an inference can easily be deemed strong without any need to
weigh competing inferences. . . . [I]f a known drug dealer exits a building . . . carrying a
suspicious package, a judge could draw a strong inference that the individual was involved in
the . . . drug transaction." Id. at 336-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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defendants in a securities fraud action be forced to produce documents
for discovery only after a finding of probable cause.155 He further ob-
served that the probable cause standard has the added benefit of being a
concept familiar to judges and thus easier to administer. 15 6 Indeed, Jus-
tice Stevens' approach would have alleviated many of the Seventh
Amendment concerns that plagued the Court by refraining from requir-
ing judges to weigh inferences at the 12(b)(6) stage.' 57 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court did not adopt Justice Stevens' approach. The Eleventh
Circuit recognized this however, and observed:
We are, however, careful not to carry the search-warrant
analogy too far. For one thing, the probable-cause stan-
dard for issuing search warrants is less stringent than the
"cogent and compelling" standard imposed on plaintiffs
under the PSLRA. For another, lying to the police or to
law enforcement in general will likely lead to much har-
sher consequences than lying to a plaintiff's attorney, so
statements by confidential police informants may be
more reliable than conversations between plaintiffs' at-
torneys and whistleblowers. These are just two reasons
why courts may be skeptical of confidential sources
cited in securities fraud complaints; there are likely
others. We conclude that the weight to be afforded to
allegations based on statements proffered by a confiden-
tial source depends on the particularity of the allegations
made in each case, and confidentiality is one factor that
courts may consider. Confidentiality, however, should
not eviscerate the weight given if the complaint other-
wise fully describes the foundation or basis of the confi-
dential witness's knowledge, including the position(s)
held, the proximity to the offending conduct, and the rel-
evant time frame. 158
Thus, according to the Eleventh Circuit, courts should not discount
confidential sources, but rather must assess the basis for their knowledge
and give weight accordingly. 159 Nevertheless, later decisions by the fed-
155 Id. at 336-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 Id.
157 Wunderlich, supra note 38, at 681.
158 Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008).
159 Id.
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eral courts have interpreted the Mizzaro decision as requiring a general
skepticism of allegations from confidential sources. 160
IV. THE PROPER ROLE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN PRIVATE
SECURITIES LITIGATION
This Part shows that the propriety of confidential informants as
sources of allegations in a securities fraud complaint is properly assessed
under the PSLRA's particularity prong. The PSLRA requires a dual and
distinct inquiry: one assessing whether the plaintiffs' allegations are par-
ticularized, and one assessing whether the allegations amount to a strong
inference of scienter. As this Part shows, this dual and distinct inquiry is
implicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court in Tellabs. Moreover, an in-
quiry that focuses only on whether there is a probability that the confi-
dential source has the information pleaded is consistent with the
underlying purposes of the securities laws in that it promotes and pro-
tects confidential sources.
A. The Statutory Text: Conducting the Appropriate Dual Inquiry of
Particularity and Scienter
The proper assessment of allegations from confidential informants
involves a dual and distinct inquiry. The Ninth Circuit, in Zucco Part-
ners LLC v. Digimarc Corp.,161 and the Third Circuit in Institutional
Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc.,1 62 clarified the text of the PSLRA and
delineated two distinct pleading hurdles: (1) the particularity hurdle,
whereby plaintiffs must describe their allegations with sufficient particu-
larity to establish reliability and, in the case of confidential informants,
personal knowledge; and (2) the scienter hurdle, whereby the statements
reported by confidential informants themselves are indicative of a culpa-
ble state of mind. 163 Each requirement on its own is a basis for dismis-
160 See Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1282-84 (S.D. Fla.
2008) (discussing the Mizzaro decision); but see Edward J. Goodman Life Income Trust v.
Jabil Circuit, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1267-68 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
161 Zucco Partners LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009).
162 564 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2009).
163 See Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 263 n.33 (3d Cir.
2009) (recognizing that for analytical purposes, it is important to distinguish deficiencies relat-
ing to the content of allegations from those relating to their form); Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at
995 ("First, the confidential witnesses whose statements are introduced to establish scienter
must be described with sufficient particularity to establish their reliability and personal knowl-
edge. Second, those statements which are reported by confidential witnesses with sufficient
reliability and personal knowledge must themselves be indicative of scienter."); Metzler In-
vestment GMBH v. Corinthian Coils., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1069 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008) (recog-
nizing that a confidential witness unable to convey information with sufficient particularity
will fail to fulfill the PSLRA requirements); see also In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig. (Silicon
11), 183 F.3d 970, 996 (9th Cir. 1999) (Browning, J., dissenting) (explaining the two-step
inquiry requires sufficient particularity of allegations as well as a strong inference of scienter);
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sal.' 64 To determine whether plaintiffs have satisfied the first hurdle, the
Ninth Circuit considers certain indicia of reliability, such as the level of
detail provided by the confidential sources, the corroborative nature of
other facts alleged, the coherence and plausibility of the allegations, the
number of sources, 165 and the reliability of the sources. 166 The primary
inquiry at this stage is whether there is a probability that the confidential
source had the information the source claims to have. 167 Once a court
determines that the source has the information claimed, the court moves
onto the second inquiry, the scienter hurdle. 168 To illustrate, consider the
following allegation: according to Confidential Source 1 ("CS-I"), a se-
nior manager of the defendant company's operations during the class pe-
riod and one of those responsible for negotiating storage contracts, the
defendant, leased extra storage space from Company A, B, and C, during
the time of the misstatements (June 2009 to May 2010) to store returned
products because the defendant company was engaging in channel stuff-
ing to enhance revenue.
Applying the Ninth and Third Circuits' standard to the allegation
above, CS-1 is a reliable source. The first inquiry is whether the allega-
tion is sufficiently particularized. 169 Here, the allegation contains the
means by which the source came to possess the information ("one of
those responsible for negotiating storage contracts during the class pe-
riod") and a specific level of detail (naming specific companies and the
Gregory Markel et al., Complex Litigation: Sometimes, the Witness is a Cipher, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 21, 2008, at C2 (analyzing the evolution of the requirements to demonstrate scienter).
164 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) ("In any private action arising under this chapter, the
court shall, on the motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the requirements of
paragraphs (1) and (2) are not met.").
165 This is a common indicia of reliability invoked by the courts. It is important to note,
however, that the Madoff scandal involved only one whistleblower, and the Enron scandal, by
most accounts, involved no conventional whistleblowers.
166 Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at 995 (quoting In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 29
(1st Cir. 2002)).
167 See Kaufman & Wunderlich, Securities Fraud Litigation, supra note 11, at 355; see
also In re Dura Pharm. Inc. Sec. Litig., 548 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (catego-
rizing a confidential source as unreliable when that source lacked sufficient knowledge of facts
underlying relevant information); In re Elan Corp. Sec. Litig., 543 F. Supp. 2d 187, 207
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (requiring confidential sources to describe facts with such particularity to
ensure the sources possess the relevant information); Weiss v. Amkor Tech., Inc., 527 F. Supp.
2d 938, 951 (D. Ariz. 2007) (acknowledging that use of a confidential informant requires a
description of the informant that sufficiently supports the "probability a person in the position
occupied by the confidential witness would possess the information alleged"); In re Trex Co.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 454 F. Supp. 2d 560, 573 (W.D. Va. 2006) (holding that allegations from
confidential sources would not be considered because they were not personally in a position to
know the information they conveyed to the plaintiff).
168 See, e.g., Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at 1000 (demonstrating the court's treatment of the
scienter prong following extensive treatment regarding the knowledge of the confidential
informant).
169 See Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at 995.
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timeline of the events). The second inquiry involves a scienter determi-
nation. 170 It is important to note that solely because the allegation comes
from CS-1 does not necessarily demonstrate that the defendant did not
act with scienter or a culpable state of mind.1 71 Under the scienter analy-
sis the court should focus on only whether the substance of the allegation
gives rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with scienter. 72
Therefore, after finding the particularity requirement satisfied, the court
looks to whether the substance of the allegation gives rise to a strong
inference.
As indicative of scienter, in this case, the allegation involves chan-
nel stuffing, a practice whereby a supplier induces its customers to sub-
stantially increase their purchases of particular products above what they
would otherwise buy from the company in the normal course of business,
thus giving the company the immediate appearance of rising revenue. 173
Channel stuffing creates the short-term illusion that demand is rising be-
tween the time a company sends an extra product to distributors and the
time when the distributors return it. 174 Channel stuffing practices can be
both good and bad however. 175 Good channel stuffing occurs where a
distributor was discounting and offering other incentives for persons to
buy. 1 76 Bad channel stuffing occurs where a distributor floods customers
with unwanted products and fabricates orders for purposes of inflating
revenue projections.1 77 Thus, here it is unclear whether the defendant
engaged in good or bad channel stuffing; it is also unclear whether the
defendant acted with scienter. 178 It is important to recognize however,
that the allegation does not fail because it was based on information from
a confidential source; rather it may fail because the substance of the alle-
gation may not be indicative of the requisite state of mind of the
defendant.
170 See id.
171 The Ninth Circuit failed to specifically address whether allegations from confidential
informants must be "discounted" under the PSLRA's strong inference requirement. Id. at 995
n.2.
172 See Institutional Invs. Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 263 n.33 (3d Cir. 2009).
173 See Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2004), rev'd sub noma.
Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs 1), 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated sub
nom. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs), 551 U.S. 308 (2007). According
to the plaintiffs, customers even called and complained about the channel stuffing and over
inventorying. Tellabs 1, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 598.
174 Tellabs 1, 437 F.3d at 598.
175 Transcript of Oral Argument at 37-38, Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308 (No. 06-484).
176 Id. at 38.
177 Id.
178 See id. at 37-38.
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1. The Supreme Court's Indirect Assent to the Dual Inquiry
Approach
The Tellabs decision indirectly recognized the dual inquiry ap-
proach articulated by the Ninth and Third Circuits. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Alito addressed an issue largely ignored by the majority
by maintaining that only facts alleged with particularity should be con-
sidered when balancing inferences of scienter. 179 He reasoned that be-
cause the statute requires facts to be stated with particularity, 180 a strong
inference must arise from those facts. 181 According to Justice Alito, to
determine whether a strong inference exists without facts stated with par-
ticularity circumvents the entire purpose of the particularity require-
ment-to prevent plaintiffs from using vague or general allegations.1 82
Thus, Justice Alito in his concurring opinion meshed the PSLRA's two
pleading requirements of particularity and scienter into a single inquiry.
But the majority did not endorse Justice Alito's approach. Rather, the
only consideration the majority gave to Justice Alito's concurring point
was to note that certain omissions and ambiguities can create inferences
opposing the plaintiff's allegations.1 83 Justice Alito maintained, how-
ever, that they should not enter the balance altogether.184 By rejecting
Justice Alito's proposal, the majority impliedly held fast to the dual in-
quiry required by the PSLRA.
2. Reassessing Confidential Informants Under the Strong
Inference Standard Erroneously Conflates the Particularity
and Scienter Requirements
Reassessing the role of confidential informants under the strong in-
ference standard erroneously conflates issues of particularity with issues
of scienter. For example, the Higginbotham court discounted confiden-
tial sources at the pleading stage because they were confidential and thus
could not contribute to a strong inference of scienter. 185 Underlying the
179 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs), 551 U.S. 308, 334-35 (2007)
(Alito, J., concurring).
180 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l) (2006) ("[I]f an allegation regarding the statement or omis-
sion is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on
which that belief is formed.").
181 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 334 (Alito, J., concurring).
182 Id. Justice Alito noted that "the particularity requirement is thus stripped of all mean-
ing" under the majority's opinion. Id.
183 Id. at 325.
184 Id. at 334.
185 Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007). "Higginbot-
ham, however, is a classic case of bad facts making bad law and.., is an opinion noteworthy
for its intemperate language-which a different Seventh Circuit panel effectively abandoned a
short time later .. " John P. Coffey & Boaz A. Weinstein, The Use of Confidential Sources
in Securities Fraud Complaints, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Publication 8
RESOLVING THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY
approach adopted in Higginbotham, however, is the faulty premise that
disclosure will in effect aid in the weighing of inferences at the pleading
stage. Yet most important to the role of confidential informants in secur-
ities fraud pleading is an explanation of how the employee came to have
the information pleaded. 186 Even allegations of job titles and job duties
merely serve as a means to suggest this probability, rather than as ends in
and of themselves. 187 The focus of the court's inquiry at the pleading
stage should be how the source came to have the information pleaded,
rather than the source's name, job title, or duties. 188 The Third Circuit
recognized this in Avaya when it stated that a confidential witness allega-
tion may score highly on the particularity requirement, but fail to give
rise to a strong inference of scienter: "[F]or analytical purposes, it is
important to distinguish deficiencies relating to the content of allegations
from those relating to their form." 189
B. An Assessment Based on Particularity is Consistent with the
Purposes of the Securities Laws
As shown, the dual inquiry approach is consistent with the text of
the PSLRA and the Supreme Court's Tellabs decision. Additionally, it is
consistent with the underlying purposes of the securities laws because it
facilitates disclosure of corporate fraud. The dual inquiry approach ap-
propriately balances the competing interests involved with confidential
sources to afford these sources needed protection, but to weed out frivo-
lous and meritless claims. As this Part demonstrates, there is significant
value in permitting confidential sources in private securities litigation
and in maintaining their confidentiality at the motion to dismiss stage.
(Jan.30, 2009), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/news/publications/data/00104/_res/id=
SAFilel/TheUseOfConfidentialSourcesInSecuritiesFraudComplaints.pdf.
186 See Teachers' Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (Shed, J.,
dissenting) ("For example, a personal aide or administrative assistant to the CEO could plausi-
bly overhear a pertinent piece of information that may later form the basis for a securities fraud
action, notwithstanding his job title."); Samuel H. Rudman, Back to 'Novak': Confidential
Witnesses in Fraud Actions, 240 N.Y. L.J 79 (Oct. 22, 2008), available at http://www.csgrr.
com/pdf/news/Novak.pdf ("[T]he real issue ... [is] whether confidential witness accounts
need to be pleaded at all or whether a plaintiff may simply allege the facts derived from
plaintiff's investigation which may come from the accounts of confidential witnesses.");Wohl,
supra note 6, at 561.
187 Wohl, supra note 6, at 561 ("[J]ob titles may convey little about actual job duties, and
formal job duties may say little about whether an employee would have been privy to senior-
level communications evidencing actionable misconduct.").
188 See id.
189 Inst. Inv. Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 263 n.33 (3d Cir. 2009).
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1. The Significant Value of Confidential Informants in
Preventing Financial Harm
Confidential sources promote the underlying purposes of the securi-
ties laws by protecting against corporate misconduct and ensuring the
integrity of our financial markets. As this Part shows, the structure of the
PSLRA necessitates confidential sources for private securities litigation.
Moreover, these sources serve important disclosure and deterrence
functions.
First, Congress itself has made plaintiffs' reliance on confidential
informants vital for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss. 190 As part
of the PSLRA, Congress erected a stay of discovery provision which
provides that courts must stay discovery pending a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. 19' Discovery is put on hold unless there is a particularized
showing that absent discovery, a party will suffer undue prejudice. 192
The provision stays even mandatory disclosures. 193 Thus, discovery
does not commence until after a court rules on a 12(b)(6) motion. 194
This stay of discovery provision coupled with the PSLRA's heightened
pleading standard has forced plaintiffs to resort to confidential sources to
fill the pleading gaps. 195 Thus, "[P]laintiffs seeking to bring securities
fraud actions must rely on extrajudicial means of obtaining the detailed
information necessary to pass muster under the heightened pleading stan-
dard; this often involves reliance on cooperative former (and sometimes
current) employees of the defendant company who have knowledge of
190 See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs (Tellabs 11), 513 F.3d 702, 711 (7th Cir.
2008). ("Because the Reform Act requires detailed fact pleading of falsity, materiality, and
scienter, the plaintiffs lawyers in securities-fraud litigation have to conduct elaborate pre-
complaint investigations-and without the aid of discovery, which cannot be conducted until
the complaint is filed.").
191 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). There is an exception, however, if a court finds upon
motion of any party, that a particularized discovery is necessary to prevent undue prejudice to
that party. See Michael J. Kaufman, Limits on Abusive Discovery, 26 SEC. Lrr.: DAMAGES
§3:8 n.6, available at SECLITD § 3:8 (Westlaw) ("An example of a situation involving the
necessity to preserve evidence may be the terminal illness of an important witness.").
192 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). Courts recognize an additional exception to the stay
of discovery when there is a risk that evidence will be destroyed if discovery does not com-
mence. See Med. Imaging Ctr. of Am., Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917 F. Supp. 717, 720 (S.D. Cal.
1995) (stating two exceptions: (1) to preserve the evidence and (2) to prevent undue
prejudice). Another additional purpose of the discovery stay is "to that it slows the race to the
courthouse" door by forcing plaintiffs to conduct more extensive prefiling investigations. Per-
ino, supra note 30, at 929.
193 Medhekar v. U.S. Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
initial disclosure requirements are subject to the disclosure stay).
194 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
195 Coffey & Weinstein, supra note 185, at 1-2.
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the misconduct at issue." 196 Given this, securities plaintiffs cannot be
expected to plead fraud with complete insight. 197
Apart from the practical fact that the PSLRA necessitates the use of
confidential sources to make out a private securities fraud claim, confi-
dential sources serve important corporate governance functions in that
they disclose major corporate frauds. As the Supreme Court has recog-
nized, the primary aim of the securities laws is disclosure. 198 And this
has been similarly recognized by Congress and all fifty states. The states
have recognized the value of whistleblowers through various legislative
enactments. 199 Likewise, through Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress acknowl-
edged the vital role confidential informants play in disclosing corporate
securities fraud.200 Indeed, some federal whistleblower laws not only
protect against retaliation, but also provide financial incentives to en-
courage this activity. 201 For instance, the Federal False Claims Act pro-
vides financial incentives for disclosure of fraud against the
government,202 as does the Internal Revenue Code for tax evasion.
20 3
The SEC has similarly pushed Congress to expand the SEC's reliance on
confidential sources and provide these sources compensation for blowing
the whistle on corporate fraud.204 These systems of government recog-
196 Id.; see also Rudman, supra note 186 (explaining that PSLRA forced plaintiffs to turn
to confidential witness accounts).
197 In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig. (Silicon 11), 183 F.3d 970, 999 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Browning, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1225 (1st Cir.
1996).
198 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); see also Geoffrey Christopher
Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securi-
ties Fraud Whistleblowers, 94 B.U. L. REv. 91, 94 (2007) ("In enacting the PSLRA, Congress
evinced its belief that the existing securities litigation regime was ineffective at exposing new
information about ongoing corporate fraud.").
199 Eletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection,
38 Am. Bus. L.J. 99, 100 (2000).
200 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 514A (2006).
201 Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 199, at 100. Some have argued that SOX should
afford similar financial incentives to corporate fraud whistleblowers. See generally Rapp,
supra note 198, at 96 (noting that the SEC rarely "shares" the fines it collects with
whistleblowers, even though it is empowered to do so in some circumstances). However,
financial incentives disproportionate to disincentives may corrupt corporate informants and
motivate them to bring false claims. See, e.g., Neil Weinberg, The Dark Side of Whistleblow-
ing, FORBES, Mar. 14, 2005, at 90-98.
202 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
203 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2006). Approximately thirty-five other federal statutes also contain
explicit provisions protecting public and/or private employees from retaliation for reporting
violations of various laws. Wohl, supra note 6, at 557.
204 Rich Edson, SEC Gives 'Wish List' of 42 Changes It Wants in Securities Law,
FOXBusiNEss.coM, July 16, 2009, http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/industries/gov-
ernment/sec-gives-wish-list-changes-wants-securities-law/ (stating that the SEC wants,
among other things, authorization "to pay awards to individuals who provide information to
the agency leading to the successful enforcement of the federal securities laws."). The SEC is
uniquely qualified to assess "the proper balance between the need to insure adequate disclo-
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nize that whistleblowers believe in, and serve, the public interest, an in-
terest that overrides the interests of the corporation whom they serve.2 0 5
The states and the federal government acknowledge that these internal
corporate sources are "uniquely qualified" to reveal misconduct because
they observe the business on a daily basis.20 6
Moreover, absent the use of confidential sources in private securi-
ties litigation, there is a substantial risk that corporate fraud will go un-
disclosed. Absent confidential sources, future incidents of massive
corporate wrongdoing, along the lines of the Enron scandal or the Ber-
nard Madoff ponzi scheme might never be revealed, or might have been
revealed too late.20 7 Corporate sources are primed to uncover fraud be-
cause of their inside status. In particular, the issue of confidential
sources in the recent wave of subprime litigation is crucial. The sub-
prime crisis caused the collapse of the banking system and cost taxpayers
trillions of dollars to place it on life support.20 8 Like complaints alleging
corporate fraud, "[S]ubprime complaints often rely on allegations of non-
public internal company procedures like lending practices or internal
quality controls. '209 And confidential sources, such as former brokerage
sure and the need to avoid the adverse consequences of setting too low a threshold for civil
liability .... " TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449-50 n.10 (1976).
205 Winters v. Houston Chronicle. Publ'g. Co., 795 S.W.2d. 723, 727 (Tex. 1990) (Dog-
gett, J., concurring).
206 Brown v. Texas A & M Univ., 804 F.2d 327, 337 (5th Cir.1986) (These individuals
are "uniquely qualified to reveal unseemly machinations by their fellow employees because
they observe them on a daily basis."); see also Rachelle Younglai & Karey Wutkowski, SEC
Pummeled as Madoff Whistleblower Testifies, REUTERS UK, Feb. 5, 2009, http://uk.reuters.
com/article/idUKLNE51402Q20090205 (quoting Markopolos as stating the SEC was neither
willing nor able to uncover the Madoff fraud).
207 See Allan Chernoff, Madoff Whistleblower Blasts SEC, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 4,
2009, http://money.cnn.com/2O09/02/04/news/newsmakers/madoffwhistleblower/index.htm
(discussing the whistleblower of the massive Madoff Ponzi scheme fraud). The very essence
of a ponzi scheme is deception and concealment: "The investor thinks that the promised high
return on his investment will come from the promoter's putting the investment to work, not
that his investment will be used to pay other investors in order to keep the scheme going."
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FAILURE OF CApIrrALIsM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO
DEPRESSION 246 (2009) [hereinafter POSNER, FAILURE OF CAPrrALIsM].
Additionally, Sherron Watkins, a former vice president at Enron, is largely credited with
blowing the whistle on Enron's massive fraud. Shaheen Pasha, Enron's Whistle Blower De-
tails Sinking Ship, CNNMoNEY.COM (Mar. 16, 2006), http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/15/news/
newsmakers/enronindex.htm (describing how whistleblower Sherron Watkins revealed the
massive Enron fraud); Frank Pellegrini, Person of the Week: 'Enron Whistleblower' Sherron
Watkins, TIME.COM (Jan. 18, 2002), http://www.time.com/time/pow/article/0,8599,194927,00.
html (detailing the same). However, her status as a whistleblower is subject to much debate.
See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GovERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN
170-72 (2008). In particular, Sherron Watkins reported corporate misconduct to the com-
pany's CEO, Kenneth Lay, in an effort to protect her job and her pension by unwinding the
internal corporate problems without notifying outside investors. Id. at 170-71.
208 POSNER, FAILURE OF CArrALISM, supra note 207, at vii.
209 Abid R. Qureshi et al., Subprime Litigation-Where Are We Now?, LAw360, Apr. 27,
2009, at 5, available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2611_1 .pdf (citing
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firm employees, are well-suited to expose the occurrence of naked short-
selling. Further, the high attrition rate at brokerage firms suggests an
abundance of these witnesses. 210
Additionally, by assessing confidential sources only on the basis of
particularity, without steeply discounting these allegations or entertaining
a general skepticism, confidential sources are encouraged to come for-
ward while still receiving necessary protection from retaliation and other
harms. As an initial matter, providing internal corporate sources with a
"whistle" empowers the person and deters misconduct:
Employees who protest corporate wrongdoing are ...
not invoking the whistle of authority but the whistle of
desperation. Their action resembles that of a person who
blows a whistle to bring help when threatened with as-
sault on the city streets. The hope is that the law will
arrive and protect not only the person's rights but the
peace and good order of the community. In a society
where the law operates well, the hope is also that just
wearing the whistle on a street, or threatening to use it in
the corporate setting, may serve to ward off
misconduct.2t1
Yet these internal corporate sources are in need of protection. In
general, confidential sources prefer confidentiality because they fear re-
taliation.2 12  A study conducted after Sarbanes-Oxley found that in
eighty-two percent of cases with named employees, the whistleblower
alleged that she was either "fired, quit under duress, or had significantly
altered responsibilities as a result of bringing the fraud to light. '213 Pro-
and discussing Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230 (1 1th Cir. 2008) and Hubbard v.
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2008)).
210 Alexis Brown Stokes, In Pursuit of the Naked Short, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 1, 24
(2009).
211 Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 795 S.W.2d. 723, 727-28 (Tex. 1990)
(Doggett, J., concurring).
212 Coffey & Weinstein, supra note 185, at 1-2. Whistleblowers also face additional
obstacles. As Professor Geoffrey Rapp notes:
Potential whistleblowers face tremendous obstacles beyond direct employer retalia-
tion. They know, for example, that bringing massive, Enron-style fraud to light
could potentially lead to their current employer's implosion. Moreover,
whistleblowers may fear blacklisting from future employers who suspect disloyalty,
as well as social ostracism from their coworkers. Additionally, the psychological
burdens associated with whistleblowing, including the effects of public criticism and
a lengthy stay in litigation's limelight cannot be ignored. Finally, employees may be
contractually or otherwise bound in a way that deters them from blowing the whistle.
Rapp, supra note 198, at 95-96.
213 Sarah Johnson, Study: Sarbox Curbs Fraud Whistleblowing, CFO.coM, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm8694488?f'related (quoting the report Who Blows the Whistle
on Corporate Fraud?). A study conducted earlier in 1999 found that roughly more than sixty
20101
670 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:637
fessor Geoffrey C. Rapp catalogues the myriad of risks associated with
whistleblowing. He notes that retaliation can take the form of being
fired, demoted, blacklisted, denied a promotion or overtime, formally
disciplined, denied various benefits, reassigned, intimidated, or suffering
a reduction in pay or hours.214 In fact, according to Professor Rapp,
most whistleblowers never work in their fields again. 215 Some corporate
sources even fear for their physical safety when making their disclo-
sures.216 Aside from retaliation, a confidential source may lose her job
indirectly because of disclosure, as in the case of Enron, where disclo-
sure led to the employer's demise. 2 17 Disincentives to disclosure can
appear in any combination and degree. As a result, the majority of cor-
porate employees who witness corporate wrongdoing do not report it.218
This evidences the true danger in revealing confidential sources. As
a result of their whistleblowing experience, one survey found that a full
third of those who had blown the whistle "would not have [in retro-
percent of whistleblowers experienced some form of retaliation. Kim R. Sawyer et al., The
Necessary Illegitimacy of the Whistleblower 4 (unnumbered working paper, on file with Social
Science Research Network) available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
917316. This fear of retaliation extends to former employees as well who will almost invaria-
bly be required by prospective employers to provide names of their former employers. Wohl,
supra note 6, at 557-58.
214 See Rapp, supra note 198, at 118-26. Blacklisting, or social ostracism can be a con-
siderably significant deterrent for whistleblowers. Our desire to belong-social conformity-
can cause us to see shorter objects as longer, change our dinner order, or even see moving
objects. See Solomon Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion
of Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN 177-90 (Harold Guetzkow ed. 1951)
(describing a series of experiments in which subjects were asked to assess the length of lines
and illustrating, as the participants generally erred more when others gave an incorrect answer
than when they answered independently, a tendency to go along with the group majority even
when the group judgment went against what their own senses perceived); DAN ARIELY, PRE-
DICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HmDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 232-38 (2008)
(describing an experiment which found that patrons at a brewery ordering out loud in sequence
chose a larger variety of types of beer per table than those that ordered in private on a write-
down menu, perhaps to convey individuality or a "need for uniqueness"); RICHARD H. THALER
& CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPI-
NESS 57-58 (2009) (describing group conformity effects in an experiment by Muzafer Sherif
which polled individuals to estimate the distance that a small pinpoint of light moved, though
it was actually stationary). Even federal appellate court judges refrain from dissenting out of
concerns of "collegiality." RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 32-34 (2008).
215 Rapp, supra note 198, at 124-25.
216 See id. at 118; see also Associated Press, Madoff Whistleblower Went Unheeded for
Years, MSNBC.coM, Dec. 19, 2008, http:llwww.msnbc.msn.com/id128310980/ (quoting Harry
Markopolos, the whistleblower of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme, as stating that he was
worried about his personal safety and the safety of his family).
217 See Rapp, supra note 198, at 119-20. This is an additional problem for confidential
sources where the source is an undiversified investor in his employer's stock. Id. at 120.
218 Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1120 (2006).
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spect] . . . because it wasn't worth it." '219 Another study found that
"nearly all whistleblowers say they wouldn't do it again." 220 This pro-
vides the most important reason to shield confidential sources: absent
assurances of confidentiality, "many truthful witnesses with knowledge
of corporate wrongdoing would not come forward," 221 thereby leaving
fraudulent behavior unmasked. Professor Rapp aptly explains the para-
dox of whistleblowing:
[T]he disincentives to whistleblowing are most potent
when the fraud involved is a major one. In particular,
the more serious the fraud, the more likely a
whistleblower is to find herself out of a job and socially
ostracized. Yet it is in connection with these major
frauds that public policy has the greatest interest in en-
couraging effective whistleblowing. 222
Therefore, the greater the fraud, the greater the disincentives to dis-
close, thereby masking the greatest frauds. Confidentiality is vital to
protecting those that do disclose fraud to the market to combat serious
fraud. Confidential sources are better served by concealing their identi-
ties than by relying on the deterrent effect of post hoc remedies under a
statutory anti-retaliation provision.223
2. Necessary Confidentiality at the Motion to Dismiss Stage
The concerns present for revealing a confidential source are not dis-
puted, but opponents of confidential informant protection argue that ano-
nymity is used to shield witnesses at the 12(b)(6) stage whose claims do
not stand up.2 2 4 As discussed above in Part V.A., however, the substance
of the allegation is accounted for in the two-prong assessment. 225 These
219 Rapp, supra note 198, at 118 (quoting Sonja L. Faulkner, After the Whistle Is Blown:
The Aversive Impact of Ostracism 6 (Aug. 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Toledo) (on file with author)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
220 Id. at 118-19 (quoting C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND OR-
GANIZATIONAL POWER 1 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
221 Coffey & Weinstein, supra note 185, at 11.
222 Rapp, supra note 198, at 119; cf Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on
Corporate Fraud? 4-5 (Univ. of Chicago Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 08-22,
2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=891482 (surveying the
parties that reveal corporate fraud and concluding that employees are more likely to reveal
fraud when they have financial incentives to do so).
223 Post-hoc remedies can raise a number of issues, such as the power of the judiciary to
enforce them. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 296 (1960)
(holding, in a 6-3 decision, that the district court had jurisdiction under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act to order employers to compensate wrongfully discharged employees for wages lost).
224 Justin Scheck, Securities Lawyers Spar over Use of Confidential Sources; Identities
Disclosed, RECORDER, Apr. 11, 2005, as reprinted in 233 N.Y. L.J. 76 (2005) (quoting, among
other attorneys, Jordan Eth, partner with Morrison and Foerster).
225 See infra Part V.A.
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concerns do not go unaddressed, rather they are issues for a different
inquiry: the scienter inquiry. The essential inquiry for the propriety of
confidential sources is whether there is a probability that the source has
the information pleaded.
Moreover, a confidential source's anonymity is most important at
the motion to dismiss stage rather than at later stages of the litigation.
Even though confidential sources must be revealed at the discovery
stage, 226 confidentiality at the 12(b)(6) stage is necessary to vindicate the
source's claims and mitigate the consequences to the source of disclo-
sure. On a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, discovery is stayed before a
plaintiff's complaint is tested.227 If a source blows the whistle on un-
proven corporate fraud, the source can easily be labeled a liar228 without
any recourse to prove otherwise. Once in the discovery stage, however,
a plaintiff need no longer rely solely on allegations from the confidential
source. 229 The confidential witness's claims can be proven with evi-
dence obtained in discovery apart from the confidential source's own
word. This is why some commentators have remarked that, "[t]ypically
in a securities case, the case is won or lost on the documents produced in
discovery. '230 It is often key for a confidential source or corporate
whistleblower to enlist the government-or in this case, private plain-
226 Rule 26 explains the timing and scope of this disclosure:
Except as exempted by Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or as otherwise stipulated or ordered by the
court, a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties
... the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual
likely to have discoverable information-along with the subjects of that informa-
tion-that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the
use would be solely for impeachment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). See In re Marsh & McLennan Co. Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 04-CV-
8144(SWK), 2008 WL 2941215, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2008) ("[T]he issue of disclosure is
really a matter of when, not whether.").
227 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006). However, an exception to this rule exists where
"the court finds upon motion of any party that a particularized discovery is necessary to pre-
serve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party." Id. See Michael J. Kaufman,
Limits on Abusive Discovery, 26 SEC. Lrr.: DAMAGES §3:8 n.6, available at SECLITD § 3:8
(Westlaw) ("An example of a situation involving the necessity to preserve evidence may be the
terminal illness of an important witness.") (citation omitted).
228 Judge Posner, at oral argument in Higginbotham, noted that confidential sources
"could be any kind of snitch, any kind of liar." Posting of J. Robert Brown, Jr., supra note
110, at 2.
229 Some worry that if confidential informants remain anonymous at the 12(b)(6) stage
and are not revealed until after discovery, the unidentified confidential informants might try to
change their stories based on evidence developed through discovery. Stephen M. Sinaiko &
Matan A. Koch, Using Confidential Informants to Meet the PSLRA's Pleading Standards, 240
N.Y. L.J. 11 (2008). But, this would require the plaintiffs to amend their complaint at a mini-
mum. Additionally, even if confidential sources change their story, if the source serves to
uncover corporate fraud, it still serves a valuable end.
230 Scheck, supra note 224 (quoting Solomon Cera, Managing Partner of the firm Gold
Bennett Cera & Sidener) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tiffs-who have power to obtain the necessary information. 23' Thus, if
the plaintiff can find evidence to win the case at the discovery stage, the
confidential source will be vindicated.
3. Confidential Informants Are Appropriate in Private
Enforcement
There is no doubt that there is continuing judicial hostility to private
securities litigation. 232 The Fifth Circuit, with former Justice O'Connor
sitting by designation, remarked that "[t]o be successful, a securities
class-action plaintiff must thread the eye of a needle made smaller and
smaller over the years by judicial decree and congressional action. '' 233 In
the realm of confidential sources, opponents of the private right of action
have questioned the use of confidential sources in private litigation as
231 See Weinberg, supra note 201, at 96 ("For whistleblowers the key is to enlist the
government-with its power to subpoena defendants ...."); see also MACEY, supra note 207,
at 178 (stating that because "whistle-blowing is not self-effectuating," whistleblowers must
rely on a "corporate governance intermediary" such as a regulator or financial analyst to vali-
date their claims).
232 This judicial hostility has been well-documented. See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman &
John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securi-
ties Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. (forthcoming 2010) (showing how the federal
courts require an event study to establish essential elements of a securities fraud claim in
contravention to the Seventh Amendment and the securities laws); Michael J. Kaufman & John
M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Rule 23 Trials in Securities Fraud Litiga-
tion, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 330-43 (2010) (arguing that the federal appellate courts
have recently, unjustifiably created Rule 23 trials on the merits that significantly impair meri-
torious private actions); Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Corruption, and the
Complicity of Courts and Legislatures, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing
Congress and the Supreme Court have been complicit in fraud from the late 1970s by gradu-
ally rescinding investor protections or outright enacting investor-hostile procedures); Joanne
Doroshow, Gordon Gekko Justice Makes a Comeback, RECORDER (Mar. 21, 2008) (arguing
the Supreme Court in Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148 (2008) ushered in an era of "Gordon Gekko justice" whereby shareholders are more vul-
nerable and the integrity of American markets more exposed than in decades). See also Carl
W. Hittinger & Jarod M. Bona, The Diminishing Role of the Private Attorney General in
Antitrust and Securities Class Action Cases Aided by the Supreme Court, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L.
167, 167-68 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court has diminished the role of private attor-
neys general in securities litigation as of late); Brett Deforest Maxfield, Ethics, Politics and
Securities Law: How Unethical People are Using Politics to Undermine the Integrity of Our
Courts and Financial Markets, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 243, 274-93 (2009) (briefly surveying
the legislative history of securities regulation before suggesting that some courts have unduly
restricted the scope of lOb-5 as per the secondary actors who act in concert with the perpetra-
tors of corporate fraud); Matthew L. Mustokoff, Fraud Not on the Market: Rebutting the Pre-
sumption of Classwide Reliance Twenty Years After Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 4 HASTTNGs Bus.
L.J. 225, 226 (2008) ("In a wave of recent decisions, the courts have made it tougher for
plaintiffs to demonstrate that a particular security trades in an efficient market for purposes of
triggering the classwide presumption of reliance. [A principal reason for this is that] the courts
have interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ... more stringently in recent years.").
233 Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
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distinct from government enforcement efforts by the SEC.234 But the
aim of the securities laws is disclosure, plain and simple.235
Whistleblowing has a strong potential for effectively uncovering
fraud.236 Thus, not only should the securities laws encourage this disclo-
sure to public officials, but to those able to instigate private actions as
well. The use of confidential sources in private securities litigation is
consistent with the historical role of whistleblowers and it supplements
SEC enforcement efforts, providing for holistic regulation of the securi-
ties markets. Moreover, as this Part demonstrates, the recent Madoff
scandal evidences the need for courts to keep alternative avenues of dis-
closure, such as private attorneys general, open to inside corporate
sources in order to facilitate disclosure of corporate fraud. Additionally,
this Part shows that private economic actors, such as plaintiff's attorneys,
can serve as efficient corporate governance mechanisms.
a. The Historical Role of Confidential Informants Was to
Alert the General Public of Wrongdoing
Historically a whistleblower served as an alert to both law enforce-
ment and the general public within the zone of danger.237 Justice Dog-
234 See Wohl, supra note 6, at 572-73. The private attorney general model in general has
come under serious attack by the Supreme Court as of late. Hittinger & Bona, supra note 232,
at 167-68.
235 S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (stating that
one of the primary aims of the PSLRA is to facilitate disclosure). It is generally accepted that
private causes of action further the integrity of American markets. See generally H.R. REP.
No. 105-803, at 2 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (finding that securities regulation has a dual aim of
protecting investors and promoting growth of financial markets); H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31
(1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (saying the overriding purpose
of the nation's securities laws is to protect investors and maintain confidence in the market so
national savings and investments may grow for the benefit of all); S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (stating that one of the primary aims of the
PSLRA is to facilitate disclosure). It is generally accepted that private causes of action further
the integrity of American markets. See generally H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 2 (1998) (Conf.
Rep.) (finding that securities regulation has a dual aim of protecting investors and promoting
growth of financial markets); H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (saying the overriding purpose of the nation's securities laws is
to protect investors and maintain confidence in the market so national savings and investments
may grow for the benefit of all).
236 INVESTIGATIONS AND FORENSIC SERV., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ECONOMIC
CRIME: PEOPLE, CULTURE, AND CONTROLS: THE 4TH BIENNIAL GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRIME
SURVEY 5-6 (2007), available at http://www.pwc.com/en-GX/gx/economic-crime-survey/pdf/
gecs..transportation-andjlogistics-supplement.pdf.
237 Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 795 S.W.2d. 723, 727 (Tex. 1990) (Dog-
gett, J., concurring).
Moreover, It would be perverse indeed to hold that an indicted corporate officer
facing years in prison and loss of reputation was barred by the privilege from ob-
taining the identities of informants located by prosecutors, while her former em-
ployer, facing the loss of a few basis points of quarterly earnings in a class action,
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gett of the Texas Supreme Court surmised the historical purpose of
whistleblowers, stating:
The term is derived from the act of an English bobby blowing his
whistle upon becoming aware of the commission of a crime to alert other
law enforcement officers and the public within the zone of danger....
Like this comer law enforcement official, the whistleblower sounds the
alarm when wrongdoing occurs on his or her "beat," which is usually
within a large organization. 238
Thus, those who "blow the whistle" on wrongdoing serve not only
to alert appropriate public officials, but the public at large so they can
take the necessary defensive actions.
b. Confidential Informant Allegations in Private Litigation
Are Necessary to Supplement SEC Enforcement
Efforts
Aside from this historical purpose, whistleblowing to private attor-
neys general serves to supplement otherwise deficient SEC enforcement
efforts. 239 Indeed, "the very act of whistleblowing indicates that govern-
mental regulation has been inadequate to protect the public; it 'represents
a breakdown of systems whose very goal is to make sure that misconduct
does not occur in the first place.' ,,240 In general, because of the sheer
massiveness of the market, the SEC cannot monitor market activity and
corporate conduct alone.241 Congress has recognized this through its en-
was entitled to broader discovery of the names of informants located by plaintiffs
counsel.
Wohl, supra note 6, at 573-74.
238 Winters, 795 S.W.2d. at 727 (Doggett, J., concurring).
239 Barbara Black, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: Reliance on
Deceptive Conduct and the Future of Securities Fraud Class Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 330,
338 (2008) ("[E]mpirical studies make clear that the SEC cannot investigate and bring en-
forcement actions against all corporate wrongdoers; the concept of the private plaintiffs acting
as a 'private attorney general' [sic] as a necessary supplement to the SEC's enforcement pow-
ers maintains its vitality.").
240 Winters, 795 S.W.2d. at 728 (Doggett, J., concurring).
241 See, e.g., Marcy Gordon, SEC Enforcement Chief Linda Thomsen Resigns, ABC
NEWS.coM, Feb. 9, 2009, http://abcnews.go.comIBusiness/WireStory?id=6838353&page= I
(stating that the SEC Commission was a lightning rod of criticism due to the SEC's failure to
detect a fifty billion dollar Ponzi scheme despite red flags raised by outsiders over the course
of a decade); Amit R. Paley & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Chief Defends His Restraint, WASH.
POST, Dec. 24, 2008, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/
article/2008/12/23/AR2008122302765_pf.html (stating that the SEC failed to detect the fraud
of the largest Ponzi scheme in history); Theo Francis, SEC's Cox Catches Blame for Financial
Crisis, BUSNESSWEEK.COM, Sept. 19, 2008, http://www.businessweek.comiprint/bwdaily/dn-
flash/content/sep2008/db20080918_764469.htm (quoting the former head of the Congressional
Budget Office as stating that the SEC "failed in its most fundamental oversight and surveil-
lance functions."); Nicholas Rummell, Tumble in Restatements Sparks Criticism of SEC,
FINANCIALWEEK.COM, Aug. 25, 2008, http://www.financialweek.com/article/20080825IREG/
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actment of the PSLRA.242 Moreover, consider that from 1996 to 2004,
the SEC was able to detect only six percent of fraud cases. 243 Journal-
ists, industry regulators, and employees made up the majority of the rest
of the sources responsible for detecting fraud.244 Additionally, Professor
Jonathan R. Macey notes that corporate governance mechanisms, such as
SEC officials, benefit little from validating a corporate source's
whistleblowing. 245 Revelations by confidential sources can be embar-
rassing to regulators who are on the lookout for fraud.246 Government
bureaucrats in particular benefit little in comparison to the cost they incur
if the corporate source is wrong. 247 Additionally, according to Professor
Macey,
[A]nalysts and other corporate governance in-
termediaries have incentives to bias their recommenda-
tions and analyses in favor of companies and to ignore
fraud. . . . Investment banks pressure the analysts they
employ to give positive ratings on companies tracked by
issuers, because positive ratings boost stock prices and
generate capital for their investment banking clients.
Thus gatekeepers such as stock market analysts and bu-
reaucrats have much to lose and little to gain from cred-
iting whistle-blowers' accusations. 248
Thus, confidential corporate sources may be least effective when
these other methods of corporate governance-the SEC and market ana-
lysts, to name a few-fail.
c. The Madoff Scandal As Evidence of the Need for
Alternative Forms of Corporate Governance
This point is further illustrated by the recently exposed Madoff
Ponzi scheme. The Madoff whistleblower, Harry Markopolos, claimed
860815 (stating that a steep decline in restatements and material weaknesses in 2008 was more
to do with a sleepier securities watchdog than with compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
242 See Rapp, supra note 198, at 105 ("Congress could have simply eliminated private
rights of action with the PSLRA, but chose not to. Congress found that private securities
litigation amounted to an indispensable tool that promotes public and global confidence in our
capital markets and helps deter wrongdoing.") (quotations omitted).
243 Johnson, supra note 213.
244 Id.
245 MACEY, supra note 207, at 180.
246 Id. at 166.
247 Id. at 180.
248 Id.; see also POSNER, FAILURE OF CAPrrALISM, supra note 207, at 259 (describing a
similar relationship with finance professors and the finance industry). The plaintiffs alleged
exactly this in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 165-67 (2d Cir. 2005).
Additionally, a post-SOX study finds that analysts, young analysts in particular, lack incen-
tives to disclose corporate fraud. Dyck et al., supra note 222, at 19-21.
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that his warnings to the SEC about Bernard Madoff s fifty billion dollar
fraud "went nowhere. '249 In fact, Markopolos sounded the warning for
fraud for almost a decade prior to the SEC's decision to investigate, but
the SEC took no action and eventually investors lost billions. 250 In 1992,
the SEC began receiving detailed and substantive complaints warranting
a thorough investigation of Madoff.251 Even "[a] minimally energetic
investigation of Markopolos's accusations would have revealed that
Madoff s volume of trading was too small to generate the profits that he
was reporting to his investors or to execute the hedge he claimed kept
those profits steady. '252 The SEC investigators, however, discovered
suspicious information, caught Madoff in contradictions and inconsisten-
cies, but nevertheless accepted Madoff's implausible explanations at face
value.253 This occurred despite the massive SEC budget increases in
2002 and 2003 in reaction to the SEC's failure to detect Enron,
Worldcom, and other frauds.254
The Madoff scandal is also a prime example of where not only the
SEC, but other corporate governance mechanisms, failed. Along with
the SEC, Markopolos went to a reporter at the Wall Street Journal with
his information, but the editors never approved an investigative piece. 255
Additionally, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 256
was likewise ineffective in Madoff' s case. Markopolos claimed he never
went to FINRA out of fear for his safety because Madoff was chairman
of its predecessor organization and his brother was its former vice chair-
man.257 Similarly, the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) was asked by examiners from the SEC to independently ex-
amine data relating to suspected fraud by Madoff.2 5 8 NASD failed to
249 See Chemoff, supra note 207. Even though Harry Markopolos was not an employee,
or former employee of Madoff's, his predicament is not unique; rather, inside confidential
sources are in an even more precarious position and in need of further protection. See id.
250 Associated Press, supra note 216; see also POSNER, FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 207, at 244-47.
251 See H. DAVID Korz, INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N, OFF. INSPEC-
TOR GEN., REP. INVESTIGATION, CASE No. OIG-509, EXEC. SUMMARY: INVESTIGATION OF
FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME 1-2, 6 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509-exec-summary.pdf [hereinafter KoTz,
FAILURE OF THE SEC].
252 POSNER, FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 207, at 247.
253 See Korz, FAILURE OF THE SEC, supra note 251, at 4.
254 POSNER, FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 207, at 247.
255 Robert Chew, A Madoff Whistle-Blower Tells His Story, TIME, Feb. 4, 2009, http://
www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1877181,00.html.
256 FINRA is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in
the U.S. For general information regarding the institution, see http://www.finra.org/About
FINRA/index.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
257 Chew, supra note 255.
258 Korz, FAILURE OF THE SEC, supra note 251, at 4.
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analyze the data "claiming that it would have been too time-
consuming." 259
Markopolos' efforts provide one example of how private actions
can supplement SEC enforcement efforts and other failed corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms. 260 The most important lesson for corporate gov-
ernance is that putting more reliance on any particular corporate
governance mechanism increases investors' vulnerability to any failure
of that mechanism. 261 Private enforcement also protects against agency
capture, an additional element that may have been present in the Madoff
scandal. 262 Both securities plaintiffs' attorneys and the SEC serve simi-
259 Id.
260 See In re Seagate Tech. H Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
("[T]he class action device is viewed as a necessary and desirable supplement to the enforce-
ment efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission."); D. Brian Hufford, Deterring
Fraud vs. Avoiding the "Strike Suit": Reaching an Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK. L. REv.
593, 638 (1995) ("The risk of restricting shareholders' ability to combat fraud through private
litigation becomes especially critical in light of the heavy burden already placed on regulators
who are not in a position to replace the efforts of private attorneys general."). Moreover,
There is little dispute about the centrality of private actions in enforcing the complex
web of securities law. Indeed, the most sophisticated critical assessments of securi-
ties laws turn not on the lack of public enforcement, but on the insufficiency of
private enforcement to deter misconduct as a result of complicated incentive struc-
tures that make it easier to collect from the firm itself or its insurers than it is to
collect from corporate malefactors.
Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 379, 381 (2007).
261 See MACEY, supra note 207, at 56-57.
262 See Faiza Virani, SEC Probes Its Own Chummy Ties to Madoff, CBSNEWS.COM, June
3, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/03/cbsnews-investigates/main5O6 0 022.
shtml (reporting SEC Inspector General David Kotz investigation of former SEC official who
had personal relationship with Madoff relative); see also Chew, supra note 255 (describing
how Madoff's brother was former vice chairman of the FINRA, making it "unsafe" for Marko-
polos to report the allegations to FINRA); Younglai & Wutkowski, supra note 206 (citing
Markopolos as stating the SEC was beholden to the financial industry). The SEC Office of the
Inspector General, however, has released a report maintaining that the failure to detect the
Madoff scheme was not the product of agency capture. KoTz, FALuRE OF THE SEC, supra
note 251, at 1.
Additionally, there now exists some support for the tentative hypothesis that SEC offi-
cials may not engage in truly impartial enforcement; in other words, there is evidence of
agency capture. See Stavros Gadinis, Is Investor Protection the Top Priority of SEC Enforce-
ment? Evidence from Actions Against Broker-Dealers 5 (Harvard John M. Ctr. for Law, Econ.
& Bus. Fellows, Working Discussion Paper No. 27, 2009), available at http://www.law.
harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/fellows-papers/pdflGadinis_27.pdf; see also Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 23 REv. FIN.
STUD. 28-33 (forthcoming 2010) (Harvard John M. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus. Fellows,
Working Discussion Paper No. 603, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=103035 (discussing how lobbying by interest groups can affect the level of
investor protection). For example, a recent study concludes that the SEC pursues broker-
dealer violations by initiating administrative proceedings as opposed to civil lawsuits to avoid
courts, as they are a worse forum for finance professionals. See Gadinis, supra at 4-5. In
addition, in administrative cases, the study concludes that for the same violation and compara-
ble levels of harm to investors, big firms and their employees are less likely to receive a ban
from the securities industry when compared to small firms and their employees. Id. The study
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lar purposes and seek to recover damages on behalf of injured investors
for violations of the securities laws. 263 The Markopolos ordeal illustrates
the need for alternative methods of disclosure; permitting confidential
sources, at least preliminarily, for private attorneys' general provides an-
other powerful avenue of disclosure.
d. Private Economic Actors Facilitate Disclosure of
Corporate Fraud
The use of confidential informants in private securities litigation is
beneficial because private economic actors facilitate the disclosure of
corporate fraud. Although Professor Macey does not specifically advo-
cate for the use of confidential informants in securities fraud actions, he
makes a compelling and analogous argument for the legitimacy of certain
inside traders as methods of corporate governance. 264 Professor Macey
argues that a limited and tightly regulated ability to sell short can credi-
bly signal to the market that the trader has negative information about the
company.265 Insider trading on the basis of information about an ongo-
ing fraud necessarily leads to the exposure of that fraud because it is not
profitable for an inside trader to simply sell or sell short without re-
vealing the underlying information. 266
Professor Macey discusses how inside traders revealed corporate
fraud in Dirks v. SEC.267 According to Professor Macey, "In Dirks, the
Supreme Court evaluated the insider trading liability of Raymond Dirks,
who received valuable information from a disgruntled employee of
then discredits the possibility that such enforcement disparities can be explained by the argua-
bly better compliance systems larger firms have in place by finding that small and big firm
violations for failing to supervise subordinates were virtually indistinguishable. Id. Last, the
study connects the enforcement disparity with post-SEC career trajectories of agency officials.
Id. As a result, the study concludes that SEC officials may be responding to future employ-
ment prospects by giving prospective employers favorably treatment. Id.
263 Hufford, supra note 260, at 595-96; Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exchange
Comm'n, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Empowering the Markets Watchdog to Effect Real
Results (Jan. 10, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchOl 10091aa.
htm ("The SEC's mission is very clear. It is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.").
264 See MACEY, supra note 207, at 179-81. Professor Macey concludes though that in-
sider trading provides a more credible signal of the veracity of the information, and that
whistleblowers are less credible. Id. at 175. But Macey does observe that a combination of
whistleblowing and insider trading appears to be the norm, and that whistleblowing can be
used to expose fraud, it is just less effective than inside trading appears to be. Id. at 177.
265 See id. at 167. One of the regulations Professor Macey states is necessary is limiting
such short selling to employees who have no power to affect the strategic decisions of the
company to prevent perverse incentives to cause harm to their firm for private gains. Id. at
173.
266 See id. at 173.
267 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); MACEY, supra note 207, at 180;
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fraud-ridden Equity Funding of America. '268 In Dirks, a securities ana-
lyst, Dirks, received a tip from Ronald Secrist, a disgruntled former em-
ployee of Equity Funding. 269 Secrist alleged that Equity Funding was
vastly overstating its assets and was engaged in a series of frauds. 270
Secrist told Dirks that he tried to convey this information to the SEC, the
California state securities commissioner, and the Illinois state securities
commissioner, but none followed up on the accusations. 271 Dirks then
visited Equity Funding and interviewed several employees and officers;
some corroborated the charges of fraud. 272 Dirks similarly urged a con-
tact at the Wall Street Journal to write a story on the fraud allegations,
but the contact would not write the story because he refused to believe
that such a massive fraud could go undetected. 273 During Dirks' investi-
gation, Dirks disclosed the information he received from the inside cor-
porate source to investors who traded on the basis of that information. 274
The SEC then charged Dirks with aiding and abetting violations of the
securities laws.275 The Supreme Court held that Dirks did not violate the
insider trading laws however.276 Professor Macey correctly notes that if
the insider trading restrictions had been successful in deterring Dirks
from trading, it would have prolonged a massive ongoing fraud.277 Ac-
cording to the appellate court in Dirks, "Largely thanks to Dirks one of
the most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered and exposed,
while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed opportunities to
investigate Equity Funding. ' 278
Dirks v. SEC demonstrates how whistleblowing to private economic
actors-in this case, private attorneys general-can similarly facilitate
disclosure of corporate fraud. In Dirks, the whistleblower, Secrist, dis-
closed fraud occurring at Equity Funding to stock market analysts, the
SEC, outside auditors, and journalists, but all of these corporate govern-
268 MACEY, supra note 207, at 174.
269 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
270 Id.
271 See MACEY, supra note 207, at 175; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 668 n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Secrist did not tell Dirks that he had also disclosed the fraud to New
York insurance regulators).
272 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
273 Id. at 649-50.
274 See id. at 649.
275 See id. at 650. Dirks was charged with violation Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b), and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act prohib-
ited fraud and misstatements in the sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a); Dirks, 463 U.S. at
650-51.
276 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666-67. The Supreme Court held that because neither Secrist nor
the other Equity Funding employees breached a duty owed to Equity Funding, there was no
derivative breach by Dirks. Id.
277 MACEY, supra note 207, at 175.
278 Dirks, 681 F.2d at 829.
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ance mechanisms failed to expose the corporate fraud.279 Only, the in-
side trader (or private economic actor) disclosed the fraud because he
had a sufficient financial incentive to do so. Inside traders may be an
effective corporate governance mechanism because they have: (1) a pri-
vate incentive to reveal corporate fraud through trading on inside infor-
mation; and (2) an incentive to ensure the accuracy of the fraudulent
allegation (if the fraud never comes to fruition, the inside trader will not
make any profit).2 80 This is analogous to private attorneys general.
Plaintiffs' attorneys have a private incentive to reveal corporate fraud
from the lawyer fees they may generate from the suit. 281 Similarly, they
have substantial incentive to ensure the accuracy of their allegations. As
will be elaborated on in Part VI.A, plaintiffs' attorneys are sufficiently
motivated to verify the accuracy of their confidential source by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, the PSLRA, the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, the possibility of a vacated judgment, and concerns
about reputational costs. 2 2 Moreover, absent a reliable source of fraud,
the plaintiffs' hope of judgment or settlement, and the attorney's hope of
a fee, is slim to none. Thus, just as private economic actors in Dirks
serve to illuminate corporate fraud, so too can private economic actors,
such as plaintiffs' attorneys, serve such a corporate governance role.
Nevertheless, the use of confidential sources in any context comes
with a certain degree of risk. As Professor Macey notes, "[t]o gauge the
efficiency of ignoring whistle-blowing, one must compare the costs of
ignoring the information with the benefits, which come in the form of
conserving resources that would otherwise be wasted in pursuing false
charges of disgruntled employees and other malcontents. '28 3 This ques-
tion however, "remains an empirical issue for which data are scarce if
nonexistent. '"284 But, the point remains: the federal courts should at least
leave another avenue open for corporate sources to alert the market of
corporate fraud, such as the form of a confidential source allegation in a
private securities fraud complaint. Steeply discounting these allegations
as the court does in Higginbotham or calling for a general skepticism as
the court does in Mizzaro unnecessarily hinders the use of confidential
sources in securities litigation.
279 See MACEY, supra note 207, at 178-79.
280 See id. at 173.
281 See William B. Rubenstein, What a Private Attorney General Is-And Why it Matters,
57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2148-49 (2004).
282 See supra Part VI.A.
283 MACEY, supra note 207, at 180.
284 Id.
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V. ASSESSING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS UNDER THE STRONG
INFERENCE REQUIREMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A STEEP
DISCOUNT OR GENERAL SKEPTICISM
The authors of this Article recognize that some courts may find the
distinction between the "particularity" requirement and the "strong infer-
ence of scienter" requirement overly formalistic. Some may point to the
Tellabs court's suggestion that the vagueness of allegations weighs
against scienter, 285 as indicating a single holistic assessment. Tellabs fo-
cused on scienter, however, and not the particularity requirement. 286
Nevertheless, even if courts evaluate confidential sources under the sci-
enter standard, Tellabs does not require a steep discount, or even skepti-
cism for that matter, of allegations by confidential informants.
A. Steep Discounts and Skepticism Rest on Inappropriately Drawn
Inferences
As we wrote previously, discounting confidential sources is incon-
sistent with Tellabs because it considers irrational, not plausible, infer-
ences. 287 The Higginbotham court's concern was that "[p]erhaps these
confidential sources have axes to grind. Perhaps they are lying. Perhaps
they don't even exist."' 28 8 Despite these concerns, however, several safe-
guards already in the judicial system prevent plaintiffs' attorneys from
fabricating a source or conducting a shoddy inquiry into the allegations
of the claim. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the possibility of a vacated judgment, and reputa-
tional costs obviate the credibility problems raised by Higginbotham.
First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the PSLRA,
require a reasonable inquiry and factual support for all allegations in a
complaint.289 Plaintiffs' counsel is required by Rule 11 to conduct a rea-
285 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs), 551 U.S. 308, 326 (2007).
286 Id at 321. ("Our task is to prescribe a workable construction of the 'strong inference'
standard.").
287 See Kaufman & Wunderlich, Securities Fraud Litigation, supra note 11, at 355; see
also Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 321 ("[I]n determining whether the pleaded facts give rise to a
'strong' inference of scienter, the court must take into account plausible opposing inferences.")
(emphasis added).
288 Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Markel
et al., supra note 163, at C2 ("[A] complaint theoretically could survive a motion to dismiss-
and a defendant could be forced to engage in expensive and protracted discovery and be sub-
jected to economic and reputational risk-even if the confidential witnesses' information was
untrue or based on rumor or misunderstanding."); Weinberg, supra note 201, at 90 (explaining
how whistleblowers can receive a portion of money recouped by the government under a 1986
law). See generally KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFoRMANT 524 (2000) (describing the famous
FBI informant Marc Whiteacre's bizarre behavior, lies, and flat-out deception in blowing the
whistle on one of the largest price fixing cases in history).
289 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) (requiring attorneys' filings not to have an improper pur-
pose, be warranted by law, and the based on evidentiary support after a reasonable inquiry); 15
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sonable inquiry and to believe that the allegations have factual sup-
port.290 In addition, the PSLRA requires courts to include in their
findings whether the attorneys complied with the requirements of Rule
11.291 Thus, if counsel were to base allegations on non-existent sources,
this would run afoul of Rule 11 and sanctions would be appropriate. 29
2
In particular, in the securities fraud context, Congress enacted a provi-
sion in the PSLRA relating to Rule 11.293 This provision requires courts
to issue findings that the attorneys and parties have complied with Rule
I l's requirement that there be no improper purpose for pleadings and
that the allegations contain existing evidentiary support. 294 But this pro-
vision is not currently utilized to its full capacity.295 Thus, if courts are
overly concerned with meritless claims, this concern can be addressed by
strengthening the application of Rule 11 and without hindering the ability
of legitimate victims of fraud to pursue legitimate claims. 296 As one au-
thor of this Article previously explained,
U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(2) (2006) (requiring courts to make findings regarding the compliance by
each party with Rule 11(b)).
290 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(b)-(c).
291 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1), (2) (2006) (stating that at the close of adjudication, the court
shall include in the record specific findings regarding compliance by each party with each
requirement of Rule 11(b) and that if the court makes a finding that a party violated any
requirement of Rule 11 (b) the court shall impose sanctions on such party).
292 See Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Novak Applied, SEc. & CoRP. L.
§ 16:102:10 available at SECFEDCORP § 16:102.10 (Westlaw).
293 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(l)-(2) (sanctions for abusive litigation); S. REP. No. 104-98, at
14 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693.
294 S. REP. No. 104-98, at 7 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 686.
295 Perino, supra note 30, at 938 (finding that courts impose small sanctions and in only a
handful of cases).
296 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 39 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 738. Proponents of securities class action reform claim that securities class actions "cost
millions of dollars in unnecessary legal expenses and are often settled without regard to the
merits solely to avoid the expense and risks of defending 'frivolous' suits. Such claims, how-
ever, are based more on rhetoric than on empirical proof." Hufford, supra note 260, at
632-33. As John C. Coffee, Jr., securities law expert, states:
The true "strike suit" nuisance action, filed only because it was too expensive to
defend, is, in this author's judgment, a beast like the unicorn, more discussed than
directly observed. Although small settlements may have been impelled in part by
the high cost of defense, the corresponding observation is that the small damages in
these cases also do not justify much effort on the plaintiff's side. Neither side
wanted to invest much effort in them-but this does not make them inherently frivo-
lous. Similarly, the economic evidence that strike suits predominate also seems
unpersuasive.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1536 & n.5 (2006). Professor Charles M. Yablon
has stated similarly that:
There is little conceptual or empirical support ... for the far more radical assertion
that these cases lack "merit" in the sense that plaintiff's lawyers do not even consider
their chances of success when deciding whether to bring them. That contention is
dubious as a matter of theory. If entrepreneurial plaintiff's lawyers do not have the
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To actually effectuate change, courts should not only engage in a
sanctions review but also impose sanctions or fee shifting if the action is
dismissed. Plaintiffs' attorneys would thus have less of an economic in-
centive to initiate strike suits to begin with. Consequently, Rule 11 can
work to impose direct costs on plaintiffs' attorneys themselves. 297
Additionally, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that
a lawyer not bring any proceeding unless there is a basis in fact for doing
so. 298 A lawyer must also be candid with the court and refrain from
offering evidence that the lawyer knows is false.299 Moreover, in the
event the lawyer later discovers that this evidence is false, the lawyer is
obligated to take certain remedial measures, which may include disclo-
sure to the court if necessary. 300
Aside from Rule 11 and ethical constraints, should the plaintiff
eventually win a lawsuit based on a made-up confidential source, this
may constitute fraud on the court, giving the defendant grounds for va-
cating that verdict. 301 Fraud on the court is a species of fraud which
attempts to subvert the integrity of the court. 302 Fraud on the court may
also include improperly influencing the court's decision and an interfer-
ence with the judicial system's ability to impartially adjudicate a mat-
ter.303 Making up witnesses would present false evidence to the court; it
is beyond mere non-disclosure, and constitutes a deliberate and inten-
tional fabrication. 30 4 If the court finds fraud on the court, the judgment is
vacated, the offending party is denied all relief,30 5 and the entire costs of
proceedings can be assessed against the offending party. 306
Additionally, attorneys that fabricate allegations would incur sub-
stantial reputation costs. 30 7 It is intuitive that reputation-the opinion or
capacity to bring an infinite number of claims (and they don't), it would seem to be
in their interest to distinguish the cases that pose a stronger litigation threat from the
weaker ones.
Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities Litiga-
tion, 94 Nw. L. REv. 567, 579 (2000).
297 Wunderlich, supra note 38, at 668-69.
298 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 3.1.
299 Id. at 3.3(a)(3).
300 Id.
301 In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc, 926 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1991).
302 Id.
303 Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2006); Pear-
son v. First Mortg. Corp., 200 F.3d 30, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1999).
304 See Greiner v. City of Champlin, 152 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating
fabrication of evidence as an example of fraud on the court).
305 Root Ref. Co. v. Univ. Oil Prods., Co., 169 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 1948).
306 Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946). This in-
cludes attorney fees. Id.
307 See HERBERT M. KRrrzER, RisKs, REPUTATIONS, AND REwARDs: CONTINGENCY FEE
LEOAL PRAcncE IN THE UNTrED STATES 219-53 (2004) (discussing the role of reputation in
contingency fee practice such as large class actions).
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evaluation of a person or group of people-can be extremely influential
in molding a person's behavior. Indeed, corporations recognize the in-
trinsic value of reputation as evidenced from the presence of in-house
public relations departments. 30 8 A plaintiffs' attorney that fabricates a
claim would quickly develop an unflattering reputation among other at-
torneys, potential plaintiffs and recurrent institutional investors, and the
courts. 309 For example, Professor Fred C. Zacharias notes that "adversa-
ries will respond differently to settlement offers and statements made in
negotiations, depending on their opponents' reputations for candor and
for taking reasonable positions." 310 Thus, a plaintiffs' attorney that de-
velops a reputation for fabricating allegations can have little hope at set-
tlement. Similarly, Professor Zacharias notes that a firm or lawyer must
maintain a reputation for taking moderate and reasonable positions
before specialized agencies or tribunals. 311 A plaintiffs' attorney and his
firm that routinely files securities class action complaints in certain dis-
tricts and before certain judges has a significant reputation at stake in
ensuring the accuracy of its allegations. 312 Additionally, fabricating a
source risks incurring substantial reputational costs among institutional
investors. The PSLRA all but requires that sophisticated institutional in-
vestors serve as the lead plaintiff in a securities fraud class action.313
Professor Zacharias notes that "[w]ealthy, experienced, and sophisticated
clients are likelier to know how to identify earned reputation and to make
the effort to identify the reputations of potential counsel. '314 Thus, in
308 Public Relations Consultants Association, http://www.prca.org.uk/Whatispr (last vis-
ited Nov. 20, 2009) ("Public relations is all about reputation.").
309 KRrTZER, supra note 307, at 220 (discussing the role of reputation in contingency fee
practice such as large class actions).
310 Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession 9 (San Diego Legal
Studies Working Paper No. 07-81 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract'962138; see also
Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the
Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 485
(2005) (analyzing a potential "reputational solution" to a bargaining problem that would en-
able parties to signal their willingness to cooperate by hiring an attorney with a reputation for
collaboration); Douglas H. Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADD and the Recommendations of Ethics
2000 to Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Considerations for Adoption and
State Application, 54 ARK. L. REV. 207, 270 n.269 (2001) (arguing that a lawyer's reputation
for truthfulness and fairness increases that lawyer's effectiveness as a negotiator in future
negotiations).
311 Zacharias, supra note 310, at 11.
312 See id.
313 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (2006). Congress's intention in passing this provision was
to encourage the use of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs to control the plaintiffs' attor-
ney. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11 (1995); see
also Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2095
(1995) (noting that large institutions did not, until very recently, elect to take monitoring roles
in private securities class action cases--despite having substantial interest in the outcome).
314 Zacharias, supra note 310, at 16.
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private securities litigation, these large institutional investors are likely to
discover the reputation of certain plaintiffs' attorneys.
Thus, a plaintiffs' attorney risks violating Rule 11, ethical rules,
committing fraud on the court, and incurring substantial reputational
costs. Each possibility imposes considerable costs on plaintiffs' attor-
neys. Drawing an inference that plaintiffs' attorneys would expose
themselves to these substantial consequences is irrational and implausi-
ble.3 15 Therefore, the inferences drawn under Higginbotham that result
in a steep discount and the inferences drawn in Mizzaro that cause courts
to view these allegations with a general skepticism should not be drawn
according to Tellabs.316
B. A Steep Discount and Skepticism Erroneously Applies Tellabs by
Tipping Scales in Favor of Defendants
The weighing in Higginbotham and Mizzaro is inconsistent with
Tellabs' mandate that the inferences need only be "at least as likely" to
be strong.317 At oral argument, the Higginbotham court stated that,
"[H]aving a confidential witness doesn't strengthen an allegation ...
Such a person could be any kind of snitch, any kind of liar... [making]
anonymous accusations against a company. ' 318 In the opinion, the Hig-
ginbotham court wrote, "Perhaps they have axes to grind. '319 Other
commentators have similarly hypothesized that disgruntled employees
were more likely to engage in whistleblowing than other employees. 320
The problem here, as opposed to the irrational inference that these
sources merely do not exist, is that the inference of a dilatory motive is
only half of the balance. 321
Tellabs requires that courts consider both culpable and nonculpable
inferences, and that on the balance, the culpable inference be only as
likely as the competing nonculpable inference to be strong.322 Recall the
315 Kaufman & Wunderlich, Securities Fraud Litigation, supra note 11, at 356.
316 See id.; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs), 551 U.S. 308,
323 (2007) ("[I]n determining whether the pleaded facts give rise to a 'strong' inference of
scienter, the court must take into account plausible opposing inferences.") (emphasis added).
317 See Posting of J. Robert Brown, Jr., supra note 110 (saying the judges in the Seventh
Circuit used Tellabs I merely as an excuse to get rid of anonymous accusations against a
company).
318 Id. (quoting Judge Posner at oral argument in Higginbotham).
319 Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007).
320 MACEY, supra note 207, at 170. Professor Macey provides other accounts of tippers
of inside information turned whistleblower because they were either upset over the size of their
bonus or passed over for a promotion. Id. at 180.
321 See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323-24 (2007) ('To determine whether the plaintiff has al-
leged facts that give rise to the requisite 'strong inference' of scienter, a court must consider
plausible nonculpable explanations for the defendant's conduct, as well as inferences favoring
the plaintiff.") (emphasis added).
322 Id. at 324.
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jade falcon hypothetical: "If a jade falcon were stolen from a room to
which only A and B had access, could it possibly be said there was a
'strong inference' that B was the thief?" 323 The majority stated yes and
that "law enforcement officials as well as the owner of the precious fal-
con would find the inference of guilt as to B quite strong-certainly
strong enough to warrant further investigation. Indeed, an inference at
least as likely as competing inferences can, in some cases, warrant
recovery. '324
To put this in a different perspective: Assume a plaintiff makes an
allegation of corporate fraud based on a confidential source. The plain-
tiff describes the confidential source by position and rough estimates of
employment time with the company. The inferences weighed in this sce-
nario would seem as follows: (1) a culpable inference that the confiden-
tial source is accurate and thus there was corporate fraud versus (2) a
non-culpable inference that the source is confidential because she has an
axe to grind or other dilatory motive. Even in a case such as this, Tellabs
requires that the tie goes to the plaintiff and therefore, the claim should
survive.325
Instead of Tellabs' rule, the Higginbotham approach applies Justice
Scalia's concurring standard requiring the inference to be more likely to
be "strong. ' 326 Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, proposed a
more stringent standard. 32 7 He argued that the inference of culpability
must be more plausible than the inference of innocence, thereby giving
full effect to the meaning of "strong," in a comparative context.328 The
Seventh Circuit takes an inference that perhaps the sources do not exist,
balanced with the plaintiffs allegation that these are actual sources, and
323 Id. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring).
324 Id. at 324 n.5 (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3-5 (Cal. 1948)). Yet, the concur-
ring Justice Scalia replied that even a strong possibility is still merely a possibility and does not
amount to the "strong inference" required by the PSLRA. Id. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia also said allowing the falcon owner to draw such an inference would contravene
the wisdom of the old maxim, "no man ought to be a judge of his own cause." Id. at 329 n.*
(2007). (Scalia, J., concurring).
325 Id. at 324 ("A complaint will survive we hold, only if a reasonable person would deem
the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could
draw from the facts alleged.") (emphasis added).
326 Compare Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (dis-
counting allegations from confidential sources because the inference that such sources do not
exist and the inference that such sources do, do not weigh in favor of the plaintiff), with
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 329 (Scalia, J, concurring) (advocating in his concurrence that the infer-
ence of culpability needs to be more than plausible than opposing inferences for the complaint
to succeed).
327 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring).
328 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Murdock, supra note 232 at 51 (arguing the courts
and legislatures have been complicit in the culture of corporate corruption and that Justice
Scalia's standard would require plaintiffs to prevail by a preponderance of the evidence at the
pleading stage where the plaintiff's lack the benefit of discovery).
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on this balance, tips the scale in favor of the defendant. 329 But, Tellabs
gave the tie to the plaintiff; the inferences must only be equal to be
strong, not more S0.330
And even assuming the confidential source has an axe to grind, this
does not negate the inference that, despite this grudge, the informant's
allegation is still true. Perhaps this informant bears ill will toward the
corporation precisely because of the veracity of her allegations. Con-
sider Dirks v. SEC in which a tipper who blew the whistle on Equity
Funding's fraud: the tipper tipped information "because he was upset
over his small Christmas bonus. '331 His allegations were no less true,
however. Thus, this adds a third possible inference: (1) an inference that
the confidential source is reliable and thus there was corporate fraud;
versus (2) a inference that the source is unreliable because she has an axe
to grind or other dilatory motive; versus (3) an inference that the source
has a grudge against the defendant, but is nurturing this grudge because
the company is committing fraud. The Higginbotham approach does not
consider this, and neither does Tellabs.332
Also, steeply discounting confidential sources because of anonymity
unnecessarily equates anonymity with the masking of an evil motive on
the part of the confidential source. 333 Even with this inference weighing
against the plaintiff because of the source's anonymity, equally plausible
inferences weigh in favor of the plaintiff. For instance, perhaps the
source is confidential because she does not want to lose her job, does not
want to be harassed at work, shunned from fellow employees, or have
difficulty securing a reference for a future job opportunity. 334 As dis-
329 Higginbotham, 495 F.3d at 757 (discounting allegations from confidential sources,
because balancing the competing inferences that such sources do not exist and that such
sources do, does not weigh in favor of the plaintiff).
330 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324.
331 MACEY, supra note 207, at 180. Moreover, consider the case of Mark Whitacre, the
infamous whistleblower who disclosed the massive antitrust conspiracy involving Archer Dan-
iels Midland Company, and several other industry participants. Whitacre was wrought with
double-crossing, dirty dealing, lying, and conniving behavior, but his allegations concerning
the antitrust conspiracy were no less true. See generally KURT EICHENWALD, supra note 288.
332 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Federal Pleading Standards After Tellabs,' 'Bell Atlantic,'
238 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2007) (discussing law professors' "tortured hypotheticals based on the Tel-
labs test"); Wunderlich, supra note 38, at 672-79.
333 See Higginbotham, 495 F.3d at 757 ("It is hard to see how information from anony-
mous sources could be deemed 'compelling' or how we could take account of plausible oppos-
ing inferences. Perhaps these sources have axes to grind. Perhaps they are lying.").
334 Wohl, supra note 6, at 553, 556-57 ("Threats of retaliation and harm to reputation
serve, however, as strong disincentives to corporate employees who consider stepping for-
ward" as evidenced by (1) government recognition of the threat of corporate retaliation against
employees through the enactment of over thirty-five federal statutes prohibiting retaliation, (2)
state recognition of likely retaliation through the enactment of forty-seven state laws protecting
whistleblowers and seventeen private sector whistleblower protection laws, and (3) Supreme
Court recognition of the likelihood of retaliation in Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,
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cussed above in Part V.B.I., those that blow the whistle on corporate
fraud expose themselves to a serious risk of retaliation and ostracism. 335
In fact, the confidential source must overcome numerous disincentives to
disclosure, including job loss, psychological strain, and industry black-
listing.336 Discounting confidential sources because they "have an axe to
grind" draws an unreasonable inference that the corporate
whistleblower's emotional satisfaction from harming her superiors out-
weighs the myriad of other disincentives to disclosure.3 37
Furthermore, the "steep discount" approach neglects a significant
inference weighing in favor of the validity of confidential informants'
allegations in private securities fraud complaints: there is an absence of
financial motive for confidential sources in private securities litigation.
Those that blow the whistle to government agencies are tainted with the
prospect of receiving a "bounty. '338 Even Markopolos admitted he was
motivated partly by the opportunity to receive a bounty.339 These boun-
ties can run into the millions, thereby giving confidential informants sig-
nificant monetary incentive to falsify information in hopes of striking oil
in the form of a false allegation that turns out to be true. There is no
361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).). See also California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp.,
394 F.3d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[Sbo long as plaintiffs supply sufficient facts to support
their allegations, there is no reason to inflict the obligation of naming confidential sources.");
Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1101 (10th Cir. 2003) ("requiring plaintiffs to
identify the source of the facts they allege is to require, in effect, that the plaintiffs plead their
evidence in their complaint."); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Imposing
a general requirement of disclosure of confidential sources serves no legitimate pleading pur-
pose while it could deter informants from providing critical information to investigators in
meritorious cases or invite retaliation against them."). In Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tel-
labs, Inc. (Tellabs I1), 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008), Judge Posner suggested that there was a
"flimsiness" in "the asserted need for anonymity" because it is unlawful for employers to
retaliate against an employee who blows the whistle on securities fraud. Tellabs 11, 513 F.3d
at 711 (citing 17 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006) (providing for
whistleblower protection)). However, the sheer volume of whistleblower laws may suggest
that employer retaliation is a very real threat. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976,
15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2006); Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 585 1(a)(l)(A)-(F) (2006); Solid Waste Disposal Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7622(a)(l)-(3) (2006); Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9610(a) (2006); Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a) (2006).
335 See infra Part V.B.1.
336 Rapp, supra note 198, at 118-26.
337 Cf. Rapp, supra note 198, at 123-24 (noting that while some whistleblowers may
derive satisfaction from reporting the misdeeds of their superiors, it is more likely that psycho-
logical factors inhibit whistleblowing, as it involves deviating from established group behav-
ior, and subjecting oneself to the nagging suspicion that suspicions of wrongdoing were
misplaced).
338 Weinberg, supra note 201 ('The government makes whistleblowers filthy rich for
ferreting out fraud on the job.").
339 Ross Kerber, The Whistleblower: Dogged Pursuer of Madoff Wary of Fame, BosToN
GLOBE, Jan. 8, 2009, at Al, A9.
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evidence, however, that private attorneys generals offer any kind of mon-
etary incentive (nor should they). Confidential sources in private securi-
ties litigation lack this significant strike against their credibility. They
have less of an incentive to fabricate information.
CONCLUSION
Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., has injected considera-
ble uncertainty into the law of confidential informants. Ironically, Tel-
labs was completely silent on the matter, making no mention of the use
of confidential informants in securities fraud pleading. Tellabs altered
the circuit's well-settled and unanimous assessment of confidential infor-
mants based on the PSLRA's particularity requirement, even though the
circuits disagreed over the degree of particularity required. The circuits
correctly recognized that the essential inquiry was whether there was a
probability that the source had the information pleaded. After Tellabs,
however, some federal circuit courts reassessed this well-settled and
well-founded assessment of confidential sources, instead steeply dis-
counting these allegations based on the PSLRA's scienter requirement.
This approach has been gaining ground as of late.
Yet this emerging trend is based on a fundamental misunderstand-
ing of how allegations based on information provided by confidential
informant relate to the PSLRA: confidential sources are an issue of par-
ticularity. A proper assessment of allegations by confidential informants
involves only an inquiry whether the plaintiff has established a
probability that the confidential source contains the information claimed,
not an assessment whether the allegations give rise to a strong inference
of scienter merely because it takes the form of a confidential source.
Assessing confidential source allegations only under the particularity
prong of the PSLRA is consistent with its text, Supreme Court precedent,
and the underlying purposes of the securities laws.
Should courts continue to reassess the proper role of confidential
informants under the scienter prong, however, this reassessment does not
require a steep discount or general skepticism out of hand. Tellabs gave
the tie to the plaintiff. A steep discount or general skepticism rests on
irrational inferences and fails to consider the plausible inferences that
weigh in the plaintiffs' favor.
